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“The same can be said about doing business in China as with Norway in the Easter sun:  
Listen to experienced mountaineers!” 
 
Helge Hareland, Chief Financial Officer, Nordic Industrial Park 
(Translated by Jørgen Horn Gulliksen) 
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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, an attempt to incorporate cross-cultural research to an innovation-
oriented approach to technology transfer is made. As cultural aspects of international 
technology transfer long have been neglected, an accepted framework to analyse the 
phenomenon still is non-existent. In this thesis, a framework for analysing technology 
transfer from both perspectives is made is made, where many aspects of technology 
transfer are covered. To try this framework out in action, two newly established 
Norwegian manufacturing firms in Ningbo, China, are used in a multiple-case study, 
where I analyse how cultural differences affect technology transfer.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
As a part a part of the phenomenon ‘globalization’, companies are growing more and 
more borderless. Large, multinational corporations have been operating globally across 
borders and cultures for years, and companies of all sizes from all industries and sectors 
are using outsourcing1 and offshoring2 as an increasingly common business strategy.  
 
There are many different factors contributing to the increase of globalization of business 
activities. One company might want to offshore production to be closer to an existing or 
get into a new market, another might want to enjoy the spoils of low-cost labour, while a 
third may want to outsource part of their activities in order to focus more on its own 
core competences, and yet another company might seek benefits from economies of 
scale. Whatever reasons and motivations behind a company’s decision to outsource or 
offshore abroad, both these business strategies involve the transfer of knowledge and 
technology to ensure that the efficiency and quality standards set by the firm are upheld. 
Another aspect these strategies contain, is that when a company moves an activity 
abroad, either intra-organizationally or to an external part, they will at some point 
experience cultural and communicative difficulties.  
 
                                                        
1 Outsourcing can be understood as contracting out a business service, process or operation to external 
suppliers or manufacturers.  
2 Offshoring can be understood as intra-organizational transfer of a business service, process or operation 
abroad. 
3 The sources I have been in contact with (including the Norwegian embassy in Beijing, two Norwegian 
Consulate General offices in China and the Norwegian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce) have not been able 
to provide an exact number, due to the fact that all Norwegian companies in China have not registered 
their presence with Norwegian authorities. To obtain data of this kind from Chinese authorities is 
extremely difficult without official backing. Therefore, the number of Norway related companies in China 
used in this thesis is an estimate made by the NCCC. 
4 Bruland (1989) takes a look at technology transfer in the 19th century between England and Norway. 
2 
 
 
As China is increasingly becoming the ‘manufacturer of the world’ and the label ‘Made in 
China’ can be found on nearly everything, a result of China’s development in the 
manufacturing sector is that an ever-increasing number of companies outsource or 
offshore their production of goods to China. Norwegian firms follow this trend, and 
while more firms are opening manufacturing sites in China every year, it is today about 
200 Norway related companies of all sorts operating in China.3 In this thesis I will look 
at how the cultural differences between the two countries affect Norwegian firms that 
set up manufacturing sites in China. 
 
1.2 Focus of the study 
 
Much previous research has been made on knowledge and technology transfer in the 
past, from several academic fields. In the field of innovation studies, there has been an 
increased focus on technology transfer as a complicated and dynamic process where the 
central element is transfer of knowledge that can complement the technology, and a 
rising consensus on the necessity of placing more emphasis on industrial networks 
diffusing and sharing knowledge and technology in a continuous systemic process of 
innovation, rather than a one-time transfer between a transmitter and receiver of 
technology (Amesse & Cohendet, 2001; Chesbrough, 2003; Cohendet, Kern, 
Mehmanpazir, & Munier, 1999; Ernst & Kim, 2002; Freeman, 1987; Grant, 1996; 
                                                        
3 The sources I have been in contact with (including the Norwegian embassy in Beijing, two Norwegian 
Consulate General offices in China and the Norwegian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce) have not been able 
to provide an exact number, due to the fact that all Norwegian companies in China have not registered 
their presence with Norwegian authorities. To obtain data of this kind from Chinese authorities is 
extremely difficult without official backing. Therefore, the number of Norway related companies in China 
used in this thesis is an estimate made by the NCCC. 
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Lundvall & Johnson, 1994; Swan, Newell, Scarbrough, & Hislop, 1999; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997; Tidd & Bessant, 2009). 
 
However, one aspect of knowledge and technology transfer has to a large extent been 
neglected in most fields of academic research, as well as in the innovation-oriented 
approach – namely, how cultural differences affect the transfer process. There have been 
a few attempts to incorporate cultural aspects into existing theory (Bhagat, Kedia, 
Harveston, & Triandis, 2002; Kedia & Bhagat, 1988; Kostova, 1999; Winkler, Dibbern, & 
Heinzl, 2008), but cross-cultural perspectives have not yet been properly integrated into 
research on technology and knowledge transfer, and the cultural aspect of the transfer is 
usually only mentioned briefly, if mentioned at all. Thus, a functioning and accepted 
framework to look into this matter is still non-existent.  
 
One possible reason for this lack of emphasis on cultural differences in technology 
transfer theory is that, in order to combine the two, there is need for a inter-disciplinary 
approach, and most researchers primarily use their own field of study to look at this 
phenomenon. Therefore, I believe my inter-disciplinary ESST master programme can 
prove helpful in providing the necessary research tools to look into this matter and 
contribute by bringing in and combining several different academic perspectives to look 
at cross-cultural technology transfer.  
 
Since publishing Culture’s Consequences (1980) three decades ago, Hofstede has been a 
dominant figure the field of cross-cultural research. In his book, he identified four 
dimensions that can be used to describe and compare national cultures. I will in this 
thesis try to incorporate Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to technology transfer theory to 
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see if the two together can contribute to form a framework for looking at international 
technology transfer that incorporates how cultural aspects affect the transfer. As 
mentioned in the background section, there is increasing number of Norwegian firms 
establishing manufacturing in China, and I will use this context to empirically examine 
the effect cultural aspects have on technology transfer. 
 
Using an innovation-oriented approach, I will in this paper first explain two transfer 
approaches and provide relevant definitions in terms of technology transfer. Second, I 
will explain how an organization can create knowledge by diffusing knowledge with its 
individuals. Then, thirdly, strategies for transmitting technology will be elaborated, and 
their relevance for international technology transfer discussed. Fourth, I will then take a 
look at the receiver of technology, and discuss important aspects for used the transfer to 
build competence and capabilities. Sixth, I will look at how cultures can be quantified 
and measured to explain national cultural differences in using Hofstede’s conceptual 
framework. After explaining research design and methods used in this thesis, I will 
examine empirical data collected from two Norwegian companies, Marine Aluminium 
and Mascot Power Supplies, who both have manufacturing facilities located in Ningbo 
(宁波), China, and analyze the empirical findings in the main part of my thesis. Here, I 
link up empirical findings with theory and discuss what implications cultural differences 
have for technology transfer between Norway and China. Finally, I will have a 
concluding discussion of the thesis, including proposals for future research and 
discussion of limitations with the thesis. The underlying research question for my thesis 
will be as follows: ‘how do cultural differences affect technology transfer from Norway 
to China?’  
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With this, I hope I can confirm my hypothesis that national variations with regard to 
culture affect the interactions involved when transferring technology between 
organizational entities located in different countries, and doing so I will hopefully also 
be able to raise the level of consciousness this effect of cultural variations with scholars 
looking into the same topic.  
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2 Technology transfer theory and definitions 
 
Ever since the industrial revolution started in England, technology transfer has occurred 
on a large scale4. It was not until the 1970’s, however, that the topic was subject to 
extensive research by scholars. From then on, several different approaches to 
technology transfer have been developed.5 In order to simplify the overview, I will stay 
with Autio and Laamanen’s (1995) broad categorisation between the traditional 
approach and the innovation-oriented approach in the vast body of literature on 
technology transfer.  
 
2.1 The traditional approach 
 
In the traditional approach, the focus has primarily been on technology transfer 
between industrialized and developing countries, where most of the benefits from the 
transfer lie with the receiving part (i.e. the less developed participant), a concept 
influenced by the contemporary ideas on economic convergence and catch-up theory, 
although not necessarily accurate in all cases (Abramovitz, 1986). In this approach, it is 
not assumed any changes in the technology during the transfer, and reverse engineering 
without requirements to generating new knowledge is a central element (Kim & Nelson, 
2000, ch. 1).  
 
                                                        
4 Bruland (1989) takes a look at technology transfer in the 19th century between England and Norway. 
5 For a thorough historical review of knowledge transfer literature, see Cummings & Teng (2003). 
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2.2 The innovation-oriented approach 
 
Although the international element also is strongly present in the more evolutionary, 
dynamic and systemic innovation-oriented approach, it is not automatically taken into 
account. In this approach, the co-development of industrial and technological systems 
through recurring interchanges between different actors sets the premise for technology 
transfer. In this way, a constant search for new knowledge in a more open and co-
operative innovation process is the description of how organizations build up 
competence.  
 
2.3 Definitions 
 
Taking the perspective of the knowledge-based economy, Amesse and Cohendet (2001) 
proposed a model where technology transfer is viewed as a specific knowledge transfer 
process that depends on how the transmitter and recipient of the technology transfer 
manage knowledge. In my thesis I will follow this line of thought and look at technology 
as involving both a body of practice, manifest in the artefacts and techniques that are 
produced and used, and a body of understanding, which supports, surrounds and 
rationalizes the former (Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz, & Lundvall, 2007). Here, it is implicitly 
stated that technology not only consists of embedded knowledge in the devices it self, 
but also consists of necessary know-what and know-how to operate and run the 
transferred technology efficiently. This is to say that buying blueprints and machines, i.e. 
technology, is insufficient to make the transfer successful, but the knowledge about how 
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to operate and run the technology is equally important to include in the transfer 
process.  
 
Knowledge and technology are transferred through transfer mechanisms, which are any 
specific form of interaction between two or more social entities during which they are 
transferred, both formal and informal.6 There are several ways to categorize transfer 
mechanisms. One is to make a distinction between technology transfer mechanisms and 
complementary transfer mechanisms for knowledge/information to utilize the first 
(Teece, 1977), while others prefer to process mechanisms and output mechanisms 
(Autio & Laamanen, 1995). Further, in following the innovation-oriented approach, I will 
define innovation quite broadly as the successful exploitation of new ideas7, because if 
technology transfer is to be viewed as a distinct knowledge transfer process, the key to a 
successful transfer is to successfully and efficiently implement, integrate and utilize the 
new knowledge (i.e. new ideas) transferred.  
 
While following this approach, I will in the empirical section look at the technology 
transfer involved when Norwegian companies open manufacturing sites in China. Before 
moving deeper into how knowledge is managed and transferred in this approach, 
however, I will start the by explaining how the diffusion process of individual 
knowledge in an organization works, and how the dynamics of organizational 
knowledge creation is essential to be able to transfer technology.  
 
                                                        
6 From Autio and Laamanen (1995, p. 648), although slightly altered. 
7 As, for instance, the Innovation Unit in the UK Department of Trade and Industry (2004) have defined it 
before me (Tidd & Bessant, 2009, p. 16)  
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3 Organizational knowledge creation 
 
Taking the view that technology transfer is a specific knowledge transfer process, I will 
in this section first break the big pieces of the puzzle down to knowledge in its simplest 
form – with the individual – and explain the characteristics of knowledge transfer 
between individuals. Then, in using Nonaka’s (1994) dynamic theory of organizational 
knowledge creation, I will explain how new knowledge with individuals can be 
converted and diffused into organizational knowledge, and further transferred between 
different entities in an organization, something that is highly relevant for competence 
building when establishing a new manufacturing facility in another country.  
 
3.1 Types of knowledge 
 
Knowledge can be defined as ‘justified, true belief’ (Nonaka, 1994, p. 15). In the same 
article, Nonaka refers to Polanyi’s (1966) classification of knowledge into two types – 
‘tacit knowledge’ and ‘explicit knowledge’ – where: 
 
“Explicit” or codified knowledge refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal, 
systematic language. On the other hand, “tacit” knowledge has a personal quality, which 
makes it hard to formalize and communicate.  
(Nonaka, 1994, p. 16) 
 
Further, tacit knowledge contains both cognitive and technical elements, where the 
cognitive element consists of what has been called ‘mental models’ that contain 
paradigms, schemata, beliefs and viewpoints which provides an individual with 
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perspectives to perceive and define their world, while the technical element involves 
skills and know-how8 in specific contexts which are difficult to capture and convert into 
storable and codified explicit knowledge.  
  
At an organizational level, new knowledge cannot be created without individuals and 
the organization can only contribute with a context in which individuals create new 
knowledge. This means that organizational knowledge creation can be understood as ‘a 
process that ‘organizationally’ amplifies the knowledge created by individuals, and 
crystallizes it as a part of the knowledge network of organization’ (Nonaka, 1994, p. 17). 
To follow this line of thought further, the same can then be said about organizational 
learning, that an organization can only learn of its members or by hiring new members 
who possess knowledge the organization did not have from before (Grant, 1996). It is by 
accumulating knowledge with its individuals an organization can build up competence 
and capabilities. I will elaborate on this in section 5. 
 
3.2 Individual commitment  
 
Commitment is essential to all new individual knowledge creating activities and 
therefore also to organizational knowledge creation and learning, and there are three 
factors that contribute to stimulating this (Nonaka, 1994). Intention, the first, is the 
notion that a person becomes conscious of something when he or she pays attention to 
an object or activity in the context of a purposeful environment. Without intention it is 
impossible to conceptualize the value of new information or knowledge, and it is the 
                                                        
8 For further elaboration on know-how, see Lundvall and Johnson (1994). 
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firm’s responsibility to provide the right environment through offering necessary 
incentives and direction to stimulate the individual knowledge acquisition (Grant, 
1996). Next, autonomy increases an individual’s self-motivation to pursue and form new 
knowledge and thus increases an organization’s chances of acquiring unexpected 
knowledge and possibilities. Here it should be mentioned that motivations can both be 
intrinsic in character, something that refers to doing something because it is inherently 
interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic in character, referring to doing something because 
it leads to a separable outcome (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The final factor, fluctuation, implies 
that when individuals continuously interact with the external world and are exposed to 
new information or knowledge, they start questioning their routines and habits, 
something that again might change their personal perspectives and definitions of their 
environment. 
 
3.3 Knowledge conversion 
 
The notion that it is possible to create new knowledge from already existing knowledge 
has led to the concept of a ‘spiral of knowledge’ (Nonaka, 1994), where four different 
modes of knowledge conversion through social interaction between individuals can 
expand and diffuse knowledge throughout an organization. In order to do so, it is an 
imperative to utilize and convert both tacit and explicit knowledge on the path to 
organizational knowledge creation.  
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FIGURE 3.1. Knowledge conversion 
Source: Nonaka (1994) 
 
The first type of knowledge conversion is socialization, a process where interacting 
individuals through language and observation transfer tacit knowledge from the one to 
the other. A common platform is created through sharing mental models and know-
how9, quite similar to how a novice through observation and practice learns from the 
experienced master. As Cohendet et al. (1999) points out, however, socialization has a 
highly localized dimension to it, making individual commitment geographically limited, 
meaning that this mode difficult to utilize across large distances, even by use of 
information and communication technology (ICT).  
 
The next mode, rooted in information processing, also employ social interaction to 
convert knowledge; in combination, however, the interaction ensures the exchange and 
                                                        
9 For an introduction to the concepts of know-how, know-what, know-why and know-who, see Lundvall 
and Johnson (1994). 
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combination of explicit knowledge between individuals through mechanisms such as 
meetings, presentations and conversations, something that can expand an individual’s 
knowledge base and lead to new knowledge through reconfiguration and re-
contextualization. After the revolution in ICT, this mode has become geographically 
independent, although a vital notion is that the individuals responsible for encoding and 
decoding should have related backgrounds or environments to avoid misunderstandings 
(Kogut & Zander, 2003), as the codified message would seem meaningless without a 
shared context (Teece, 1981). 
 
Both the third and the forth modes of conversion involve tacit as well as explicit 
knowledge, implying that the two knowledge types are complementary and that the one 
can expand the other and visa versa. Internalization, conversion from explicit to tacit 
knowledge, has much to do with what we usually understand as ‘learning’, both 
individually and in an organizational context. Here, it is important to note that 
internalization contain both transmission and application, where the first stage is 
dependant on communication of explicit, codified knowledge, and the latter stage 
involves getting the necessary experience and know-how through practice (Cohendet, et 
al., 1999).  
 
The fourth, externalization, is when tacit knowledge is codified and made explicit. As 
tacit knowledge supposedly is inexpressible, however, this is the theoretically least 
developed mode of conversion, though it is stated that through the use of metaphor, 
models, concepts, analogies and so on, codification of tacit knowledge can be promoted 
(Cohendet, et al., 1999; Nonaka, 1994). If converted successfully, this implies that local, 
tacit knowledge without any regard for geographical proximity can be transferred 
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globally. However, as some aspects of tacit know-how often are specific and related to 
its original context, they are impossible to codify (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994). 
 
3.4 The spiral of knowledge 
 
As we can see, there are several factors that affect the process of organizational 
knowledge creation: type of knowledge involved, individual commitment and utilization 
of knowledge conversion. By creating dialogue between existing bases of tacit and 
explicit knowledge with the individuals of an organization, a dynamic spiral of creating 
knowledge within an organization can be achieved (Cohendet, et al., 1999). This process 
allows knowledge to be diffused throughout the organization, and thus complies with 
the already mentioned definition of organizational knowledge creation.  
 
Moreover, the principles are the same when knowledge (i.e. also technology as explicit, 
codified knowledge embedded10 in devices and machinery) is transferred between to 
organizational entities, no matter how far apart from each, although some of the 
conversion modes are more geographically dependant than others, making transfer 
more problematic across large distances. In the next section, I will make clear the 
importance of having a conscious knowledge management strategy in an organization to 
be able to utilize intra-organizational knowledge transfer between different entities. 
 
 
                                                        
10 Blackler (1995) defines and uses a finer typology of knowledge than provided by Nonaka, where 
embedded knowledge, among other types, is explained. 
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4 The transmitter of technology 
 
After reviewing the different types of knowledge and modes of knowledge conversion, it 
will be helpful, with regard to knowledge and technology transfer, to take a look at the 
knowledge management strategies the transmitting part in an organization can apply to 
improve the pace of knowledge diffusion. In my thesis, knowledge management (KM) 
will be defined rather broadly to include any processes and practices concerned with the 
creation, acquisition, capture, sharing and use of knowledge, skills and expertise (Swan, 
et al., 1999, p. 264), all of which are relevant with regard to technology transfer.  
 
After studying KM practices in several industries, with a special emphasis on the 
knowledge intensive consulting firm industry, Hansen et al. (1999) identified two major 
KM strategies – namely the codification strategy and the personalization strategy. These 
different approaches to managing knowledge emphasize its own type of the two 
knowledge classifications elaborated on above, tacit and explicit, and can provide a more 
practical dimension to observing how knowledge is managed in firms and organizations. 
Further, in terms of technology transfer, these two strategies can help shed light on the 
tacit and explicit dimensions involved in the transfer as well. 
 
4.1 The codification strategy 
 
As the name suggests, the codification strategy centres on codification of knowledge, i.e. 
converting tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. Even though Nonaka (1994) claims 
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this conversion type to be the least explored and most novel within academic research, 
he still argues that the transformation can be done in a process of conceptualization and 
crystallization, as I have already mentioned in the section on externalization. In Hansen 
et al.’s (1999) article, the conversion process itself is not called attention to, it is simply 
stated that some companies have developed elaborate ways to codify, store and reuse 
knowledge by extracting it in what is called a “people-to-documents” approach. This 
makes computers and databases central in the codification strategy.  
 
As Tidd and Bessant (2009, ch. 11) point out, a KM strategy depends on more than the 
implementation of technology in order to be successful. Therefore, while firms utilizing 
this strategy hire able people, more emphasis is usually put on training in internal 
systems and programs than the excellence of employees. By pursuing this strategy, 
knowledge becomes independent from any one individual and knowledge can efficiently 
be shared throughout the organization, and in this way the organization can prevent it 
self from “inventing the wheel” several times.  
 
In terms of technology transfer, the codification strategy can be identified through 
transfer of blue prints, software, formulas, and routines, and so on, to a receiving part. 
Further, an important property of codification strategy is that ‘the more a given item of 
knowledge or experience has been codified, the more economically it can be transferred’ 
(Teece, 1981, p. 83). This implicitly makes mature technologies in general cheaper to 
transfer since they often are better codified (Kogut & Zander, 2003).   
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4.2 The personalization strategy 
 
On the other hand, in the personalization strategy, knowledge is closely linked with an 
individual. The sharing and transfer of knowledge is done by personal contact through 
dialogue, either directly or by use of information technology (ICT). To facilitate this, 
organizations pursuing this strategy focus on building networks and “people-finder-
databases” to map the location of knowledge, and the hiring of highly competent people 
is seen as an imperative to ensure the development of tacit knowledge with the 
employees. However, as the personalization strategy implies that knowledge that has 
not been codified cannot be extracted from an individual and diffused through other 
means that personal contact such as dialogue, Hansen et al.’s observations might 
somewhat collide with Nonaka’s view that tacit knowledge, due to its inexpressibility, is 
difficult to acquire only through dialogue as people know more than they can express.  
 
Instead, in terms of technology transfer, this strategy involves sending personnel 
(transferors) with necessary experience and know-how to the receiving part of the 
transfer. In doing so, it is possible to help the recipient decode and explain codified 
knowledge that lies out of a shared context with the recipient, and also letting the 
recipient acquire tacit knowledge through observation. With this, the transferor can 
help the receiver internalize new codified knowledge, while at the same time diffuse 
non-codified tacit knowledge through socialization. However, as sending transferors 
either on short-term stays or as expatriates often is a necessary, although expensive, 
compliment or alternative to only converting tacit to codified knowledge, it is in using 
the personalization strategy a critical factor that the technology being transferred is 
completely understood by the transferor (Teece, 1977, 1981).  
18 
 
 
 
Another point worth mentioning in terms of utilizing the personalization strategy, and 
also of relevance to reduce costs in terms of time needed to successfully transfer and 
implement both tacit and explicit knowledge, is previous experience in similar transfer 
processes, something Kogut and Zander (2003) point out to be among the most 
persistent findings in literature with regard to transfer costs in technology transfer 
theory. This indicates that it is possible to accumulate some sort of technology transfer 
know-how with the individuals of an organization, and that these individuals can 
function as a sort of ‘transfer experts’, depending on the transferor’s personal qualities 
and accumulated knowledge about transfer processes through experience.  
 
4.3 Combining the two strategies 
 
After reviewing both the personalization and the codification strategy, it seems as 
though each of them can serve its rightful purpose in a knowledge transfer process, all 
depending on which type of knowledge an organization want to transfer. In a technology 
transfer process, however, there will always be an embedded component of codified 
knowledge in the devices and machinery, as well as an embodied11 tacit component of 
know-how (i.e. how to operate and run the codified knowledge efficiently).  
 
This implies that the personalization and the codification strategy are not in conflict 
with each other; rather, they are both needed in a technology transfer process where 
they can provide complementary knowledge needed for a successful transfer. Further, 
                                                        
11 Also taken from Blackler’s (1995) typology.  
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because of technology transfer’s dual involvement with both tacit and explicit 
knowledge, it is plausible to expect the two strategies to overlap in a transfer process. As 
Hansen et al. (1999) opt for an 80-20 split between either of them, where one is the 
predominant KM approach, and the second is used to support the first. However, this 
80-20 split may not be advantageous in all transfers processes. In the case of technology 
transfer, it is perhaps more likely that this split rather depends on the ‘degree of 
tacitness’ involved in the process (Nelson & Winter, 1982).   
 
‘The degree of tacitness’ does nevertheless not alone determine which strategy a firm 
should give priority; another determinant is transfer costs, as codified knowledge is easy 
to communicate and diffuse, while the tacit knowledge that cannot be codified must be 
observed and applied through practice, making the latter slow, uncertain and expensive 
to transfer (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Hence, maturity of the technology and 
previous experience in transferring it matters, something Kogut and Zander’s claim that 
‘experience in internal transfers encourages more internal transfers in the future’ can be 
seen as a confirmation of. (Kogut & Zander, 2003, p. 520). Therefore, as already 
mentioned, mature technologies with its higher degree of codification and thus a higher 
degree of applicability to new users will probably be less costly to transfer and the 
preferable transfer strategy for firms. Following this line of thought further, prospective 
transferors have a higher probability of fully understanding the technology and having 
accumulated previous experience in similar transfer processes for diffusing the 
knowledge still tacit with the technology.  
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However, success of the transfer lies not only with the transfer strategies implemented 
by the transmitter. As explained in the next section, it also lies with the receiving part’s 
ability to implement and learn how to use the knowledge and technology transferred.  
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5 The receiver of technology 
 
According to Nonaka, an organization can build up competence and capabilities by 
accumulating knowledge with its individuals, both tacit and explicit. In the case where a 
Norwegian company decides to set up a new manufacturing site in China, the managers 
have to build up a knowledge base from scratch, and then it is important to manage this 
in a way so that competences and capabilities are efficiently transferred, absorbed and 
accumulated with the new employees to secure a spiral of knowledge creation. In this 
way, the new manufacturing site can start producing according to expected time and set 
standards as fast as possible.  
 
But what exactly does competence and capability in an organizational context involve, 
and through which mechanisms can they be transferred? Moreover, how can an 
organizational entity integrate competence and capabilities, and learn how to improve 
its competences by it self? 
 
5.1 Competence and capabilities  
 
After reviewing the characteristics of knowledge and knowledge transfer in a technology 
transfer context, it is time to see how competences and capabilities can be replicated12 
at a new manufacturing site. First, however, as many scholars have used these two terms 
interchangeably, I will define what the concepts of competences and capabilities imply.  
 
                                                        
12 An assumption here is of course that the technology transferred is mature, and that the transferring 
part already possesses competence with regard to that technology. 
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I prefer to look at competence in terms of what appears from the learning process in a 
firm or organization that requires combined skills and knowledge. This necessitates that 
a firm can have basic, reproductive competences which are static, and also ‘core 
competences’ defined by the competences that can provide a sustainable competitive 
advantage for a firm through performing certain activities (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  
To say it simple, ‘competences express what a firm can do’ (Cohendet, et al., 1999, p. 
229).  
 
While capabilities also involve the competences of a firm, it has a more dynamic aspect 
where both internal and external competences are integrated, built and reconfigured to 
help the firm adapt to a changing environment (Teece, et al., 1997). Thus, dynamic 
capabilities entail the ability of changing routines and promoting innovation to further 
create new capabilities and competitive advantage (Cohendet, et al., 1999). Hence, a firm 
or an organization can by transferring the necessary knowledge that complements the 
use of technology help the receiver enhance their competences and by this also 
contribute to the formation of capabilities. In the two following sections I will, first, 
explain how competence building can be facilitated, and then look at how capability 
formation can form and develop. 
 
5.2 Competence building 
 
As Grant noted, ‘transferring knowledge is not an efficient approach to integrating 
knowledge’ (Grant, 1996, p. 114).  The first step to building up competence from scratch 
is obviously the recruitment of able people possessing the desired person-embodied 
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knowledge base (both informal and formal, i.e. tacit and explicit) and commitment that 
will enable them to learn how to perform the required job tasks in a fast and satisfactory 
way.  
 
In replication of routines and operating procedures, existing personnel and training 
operations in place with the transferring part already provide the necessary capability 
to select and modify the sorts of employees required, and can contribute by defining the 
formal requirements of the different sorts of employees (Nelson & Winter, 1982). An 
important notion here is that it might be difficult to assess the level of tacit knowledge 
possessed by individuals, and in the recruitment process managers can only assume 
their level of embodied knowledge by looking at previous experience and formal 
training.  
 
After building a knowledge base by recruiting people that fulfil the desired 
requirements, the firm can start building competences by effectively utilizing knowledge 
conversion that lead to productive learning and internalization of new knowledge with 
its workers. Diffusion of technology is completed only when transferred knowledge is 
internalized and translated into the capability of the receiver (Ernst & Kim, 2002)13. 
Before moving on to capabilities, I will take a closer look at some competence 
integration mechanisms, and discuss their implications. 
  
5.2.1 Integration mechanisms 
 
                                                        
13 Here, I suspect that Ernst and Kim are using the concepts of competence and capability somewhat 
interchangeably. 
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In the mentioned work by Grant (1996), he identifies four mechanisms for integrating 
specialist knowledge by joining together literature on explicit and implicit coordination 
mechanisms that can promote and enhance the competences of a firm through learning.  
 
The first, rules and directives, can be understood as standards set by experts to regulate 
and facilitate interactions between and behaviour of individuals. Further, rules and 
directives help comprehend and integrate expert knowledge of others, for instance by 
incorporating HSE (health, safety and environment) regulations at the work place, an 
HSE experts does not need to teach all the workers all he or she knows about HSE, 
rather it is incorporated in the production process it self. 
 
Secondly, sequencing is a simple method for letting individuals integrate their 
knowledge to operations in a time saving fashion. A notion here, however, is that some 
production activities are not suited for sequencing – with factors like product 
characteristics, physical inputs and production technology deciding the potential, 
making sequencing technologically determined.  
 
Thirdly, routines, while often simple to perform, they have the ability of coordinating 
relatively complex patterns of interactions and behaviour between individuals and make 
them function as a unit. This matches quite accurately with Nelson and Winter’s 
perception of routines as embedded organizational memory, as both tacit and explicit 
organizational knowledge reside in routines (Blackler, 1995; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
 
Finally, group problem solving and decision-making require more personal and 
communication based interaction. This mechanism can be both face-to-face and group 
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based (meetings etc.), and can supplement the first three mechanisms for 
implementation and integration of knowledge. The biggest strength of this mechanism is 
that individuals can indirectly communicate their expert tacit knowledge, through 
expressing their views, although because of the difficulties of expressing this accurately 
it is usually not easy to reach consensus in this kind of decision-making.   
 
5.2.2 Reviewing the mechanisms 
 
As we can see from Grant’s four knowledge integration mechanisms, the first three are 
highly related to the codification strategy mentioned earlier. The codified knowledge of 
the transmitter are implemented with the receiving part, and in the process also 
internalized with the workers who eventually develop the know-how embedded in the 
organizational practice (Ernst & Kim, 2002). Further, the argument that the encoder and 
decoder need a common knowledge base and context for this process to work, once 
again highlights the importance of selecting and recruiting the right people to fill the 
empty positions at the new site. However, some degree of assistance to the receiving 
part’s employees must be expected in the learning processes involving these 
mechanisms - the degree of course depending on the maturity and complexity of the 
technology (‘degree of tacitness’).  
 
Here as well, transaction costs will play a part in the selection of integration 
mechanisms, as all three ‘seek efficiency of integration through avoiding the costs of 
communication and learning’ (Grant, 1996, p. 115).  
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Another notion is that the degree of tacitness in a technology (and its complementary 
knowledge), is decided by how well the technology is understood by the transferring 
part for the knowledge involved to be properly codified (Jensen, et al., 2007), and if the 
knowledge needed to operate and run the technology derives from experience or not 
(Asheim & Gertler, 2005). If the tacit component is big, trial and error through learning 
by doing, using and interacting is necessary to incrementally14 improve the products or 
processes involved15. This can cumulatively improve efficiency as the users get more 
familiar with the technology, something Kline and Rosenberg’s (1986) example of 
improvements in the electric power generation industry exemplifies.  
 
However, in the Doing, Using and Interacting (DUI) mode of innovation (Jensen, et al., 
2007), where learning by doing, using and interacting are rightfully considered efficient 
ways to enhance the skills and know-how of the workers, it is emphasised that in the 
learning form of interacting in or between teams it might be beneficial with assistance 
from the transferring part to speed up this process. This bears similarity to Nonaka’s 
socialization mode of conversion, although generally carried out more at a group level 
where several knowledge bases are brought together to create new knowledge, 
preferably under the supervision and guidance of an experienced transferor that 
completely understands the technology, as suggested in the personalization strategy.  
 
That brings me over to group problem solving and decision-making, which involves a lot 
of tacit knowledge. As utilizing this mechanism can be considered a learning process 
                                                        
14 Freeman & Perez (1988) have an excellent taxonomy of innovation where incremental innovations 
also are distinguished. The others are radical innovations, changes in ‘technology system’ and changes in 
‘techno-economic paradigm’ (technological revolutions). 
15 In Fagerberg (2005) it is explained that the cumulative impact of incremental innovations have ‘just as 
great (if not grater)’ impact on economical and societal change as radical innovations.  
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that pulls on and combines the different skills and knowledge bases of the employees, 
this mechanism, according to the definition of competence mentioned above, should 
contribute to building competence(s) within an organization. Here, as in the DUI mode 
of innovation in general, new or changed routines or procedures shared for the 
organization can often be the outcome of such a process (due to the new knowledge 
generated by the interaction between employees). As these innovative changes can be 
considered dynamic, parts of these competence building knowledge integration 
mechanisms involve aspects associated with capabilities. 
 
The four elaborated implementation mechanisms have been centred on intra-
organizational transfer of knowledge. However, it is not enough for a company to just 
build competences without regard to the world outside the organization in order to gain 
or maintain a competitive advantage. Therefore, I will now explain the importance of 
inter-organizational interaction to further enhance the competence base of a firm and 
capabilities formation. 
 
5.3 Capabilities building 
 
In the already mentioned articles by Ernst & Kim (2002) and Amesse & Cohendet 
(2001), much emphasis is put on the importance of local capabilities formation, 
something that is essential to an effective organization capable of efficient production.16 
                                                        
16 Here it should be noted that producing custom made products (or novel products) require more in 
terms of capabilities than producing standard products (mature), although standard product’s design and 
production processes are constantly (though slowly) changed as a respond to changing market demands, 
technological opportunities and so on, thus also requiring some degree of adaptability to changing 
environments. Asheim and Gertler (2005) make a relevant distinction between a ‘synthetic’ knowledge 
base that corresponds to industries where incremental innovation through application or novel 
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Firms and other organizations operate in changing environments, and have to be flexible 
as to adapt to their new environment accordingly. This requires the formation of 
capabilities. In order to build capabilities in an organization there are two major facets 
that need to be in place, namely the ability to reconfigure and upgrade the knowledge 
base within the firm and to develop and exploit networks for knowledge sharing in 
order to internalize and make use of external knowledge.  
 
5.3.1 Absorptive capacity 
 
As already mentioned, to utilize intra-organizational knowledge conversion and 
promote organizational knowledge creation, an existing knowledge base and 
commitment to learning are important (Ernst & Kim, 2002; Nonaka, 1994). Another 
relevant point with regard to this can be taken from the influential work on absorptive 
capacity (AC) by Cohen and Levinthal, where they defined it as ‘the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to 
commercial ends’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). This implies that the firm must use 
its knowledge and competence base to search out, select and implement new, external 
knowledge that can complement and enhance (and perhaps even alter) its existing 
knowledge and competence base.  
 
Initially, Cohen and Levinthal emphasised the importance of R&D to build AC in a firm 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tidd & Bessant, 2009, ch. 5). There is little doubt that R&D 
                                                                                                                                                                             
combinations of existing knowledge based on know-how and some applied research are predominant, and 
an ‘analytical’ knowledge base that include knowledge-intensive industries where scientific knowledge is 
essential, and radical innovations are more likely to occur. As this thesis looks at manufacturing, it is the 
synthetic knowledge base that is the most relevant.  
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can lead to expansion of a firm’s knowledge base (know-why and know-what17) when 
managed properly, and by this also increase its AC by being more able to identify and 
recognize valuable external knowledge. This line of thought has some resemblance to 
the linear model of innovation (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986) and the Science, Technology 
and Innovation mode of innovation (Jensen, et al., 2007), where R&D may be 
overemphasised in the slightly credulous way that, by investing heavily in R&D, 
increased efficiency in routines and production will ‘automatically’ be facilitated while 
at the same time promoting innovation.  
 
While the fact that R&D undeniably brings benefits in terms of a more profound 
understanding of technologies by generating information and knowledge and 
codification, and also occasionally develop radical or even more significant innovations, 
it is important to note that this does not automatically imply technological or 
organizational advance. Also, even if a firm can recognize, value and acquire external 
knowledge, it does not necessarily mean they can exploit it commercially or that it will 
lead to innovation. 
 
5.3.2 Potential and realized absorptive capacity 
 
To make up for this, Zahra and George (2002) came up with an extension to existing 
theory in an article reviewing previous absorptive capacity research, where, rather than 
a single absorption, several different processes were involved in two types of absorptive 
capacity – potential AC and realized AC. The first, potential AC, involves the capability to 
                                                        
17 Know-what (knowledge about facts) and know-why (knowledge about the principles and laws behind 
the facts) are part of the taxonomy of knowledge mentioned earlier by Lundvall and Johnson (1994). 
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acquire and assimilate new knowledge, and reflects the search and select phase 
(recognition of value) in Cohen and Levinthal’s original paper, and for potential AC it is 
important to have a solid knowledge base to recognize valuable knowledge through 
shared context.  
 
Secondly, realized AC is the utility of a transformation and an exploitation process. In the 
transformation process, new knowledge is revised and combined with existing 
knowledge to create a new platform of knowledge that can help firms to streamline or 
change routines, and also see new entrepreneurial opportunities. Further, the 
exploitation process is similar to what Cohen and Levinthal emphasised about 
application to commercial ends. In the article, exploitation is defined as ‘an 
organizational capability […] based on the routines that allow firms to refine, extend, 
and leverage existing competencies or to create new ones by incorporating acquired and 
transformed knowledge into its operations’ (Zahra & George, 2002, p. 190). So, in 
viewing AC in terms of potential and realized AC, it captures the importance of building 
up the knowledge base within the firm, both by internal and external knowledge 
sources, and the ability to utilize new knowledge. 
 
After introducing Zahra and George’s distinction between the two types of AC, each with 
two dimensions to it, it is tempting to once again mention Lundvall and Johnson’s 
(1994) categorization of knowledge. In the search for useful knowledge, know-who18 
implies that not only the facilitation of acquisition, assimilation, transformation and 
exploitation of external knowledge, but also that it is important to first find out where 
the needed knowledge is to be found and then develop links to the external sources that 
                                                        
18 Know-who directs attention to specific and social relations, meaning that a firm knows ‘who knows 
what and can do what’ (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994, pp. 28). 
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possess this knowledge, thus building a network. In order to utilize a network, know-
who can be equally important as internal R&D. And know-who is, as know-how and tacit 
knowledge, difficult to codify and transfer (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994), and can therefore 
not easily be transferred between organizational entities.  
 
Further, when searching the market and recognizing valuable knowledge, it is in AC 
theory important to internalize this knowledge and adapt existing knowledge and 
practices to better suit the changing environment the firm operates in. This makes AC 
highly relevant, if not essential, to develop the dynamic capabilities needed to promote 
innovation and renewal of the firm. In terms of technology transfer, it is for the receiving 
part important not to rely solely on the origin of the transfer (the transmitter) for 
complementary knowledge input, but through a network develop several sources of 
knowledge that can further enhance the knowledge base and competences of a firm.  
 
5.3.3 Networks 
 
Another way to emphasis the importance of creating large, extensive networks, either 
locally or between geographically dispersed groups (by use of ICT), to promote the 
creation of innovation, is to use the concepts of ‘exploitation’19 and ‘exploration’20 
(March, 1991; Swan, et al., 1999), although here different meanings are added to the 
concepts than discussed earlier. While exploitation of knowledge is relevant to 
innovation by its purpose of preventing firms from ‘reinventing the wheel’, it is largely 
exploration of knowledge that can generate genuinely new approaches. Developing an 
                                                        
19 I.e. where existing knowledge is captured, transferred and deployed in other similar situations.  
20 In this article, exploration is defined as sharing and synthesising knowledge, thus leading to new 
knowledge, a somewhat more blurry and broad definition that the one offered by Zahra and George.  
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extensive network will support the utility of both strategies, the former by making it 
easier to monitor technological development in the market, and the latter by increasing 
co-development of knowledge with external knowledge bases.   
 
However, the problems of transferring tacit knowledge are once again highlighted in this 
article, where they claim that ‘sharing and exchange of tacit knowledge may arguably be 
even more difficult where innovation processes are interactive’ (Swan, et al., 1999, p. 
270), because of increased chances of the required shared context and environment 
needed to understand the ‘language’ of the knowledge transferred being absent. So, 
while it in Swan et al.’s view is important to develop several sources of knowledge in a 
network to promote innovation, the possibility of not being able to transfer 
complementary tacit knowledge seems to increase in a network. 
 
When operating in a network, one way to make up for increased difficulties of context 
understanding is to develop stronger inter-organizational ties. That brings me over to 
the research by Chesbrough (2003) on how ‘open’ or ‘closed’ an organization is to 
knowledge or technologies from external sources. In his article, he explains the current 
trend of moving from a closed innovation model, where companies generate, develop 
and commercialize their own ideas, toward an open innovation model, where companies 
are constantly on the search for external knowledge. In opening up the innovation 
process, development of close ties to partners, suppliers and customers in extensive 
networks is essential, something that also corresponds to the systemic innovation-
oriented approach. In the network, external sources are searched for knowledge and 
monitored for technology development, while in-house R&D-generated knowledge at 
the same time can be brokered in a way quite similar to commodities in a market to 
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secure the flow of useful knowledge in interacting with the external sources in the 
network. Doing this, firms can commercialize both their own ideas and innovations 
coming from other sources to maximize value, while at the same time strengthening the 
ties to partners, suppliers and customers.  
 
The general idea behind this concept is that organizations have to open up their 
innovation processes, and although large-scale internal knowledge sources in a firm 
(including R&D) are essential as knowledge brokers and for implementation of external 
knowledge in the firm, they are insufficient to keep or gain competitive advantage 
without external influences (Tidd & Bessant, 2009), and networks offer a way to share 
and exchange the knowledge complementarities needed to make up for this (Cohendet, 
et al., 1999).  
 
Therefore it is justifiable to say that the knowledge flows involved in technology transfer 
is getting more bi- or multidirectional, where the key is co-evolvement of absorptive 
capacity and emitting capacity in networks (Amesse & Cohendet, 2001). This statement 
complies with Ernst and Kim’s (2002) perception of the evolution of global production 
networks (GPN), in which a network flagship and its suppliers co-develop absorptive 
capacity by increasing each others knowledge base through knowledge transfer and 
interaction, while, at the same time, these local suppliers develop their own local ‘mini-
GPNs’ , in which their own suppliers in co-operation help with the accommodation of 
local capabilities formation. However, as we have seen earlier, the manufacturing 
industry mainly relies on what Asheim and Gertler (2005) called a ‘synthetic’ knowledge 
base that has high tacit component to it, and in transferring this the main source of 
knowledge will often come from intra-organizational sources located far away, and 
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there is still the problem with tacit knowledge transfer being geographically limited and 
difficult to transfer, both intra-organizationally and in networks.  
 
5.3.4 Geographical limitations and advantages 
 
In a network the firm can function as an entity similar to KM’s perception of the 
individual in an organization in need of enhancing both its tacit and explicit knowledge 
base to develop and improve its performance. In organizational knowledge creation 
knowledge conversion between individuals is essential to enhance the organizational 
knowledge base, and in networks firms have to exchange knowledge and interact with 
one another to facilitate the implementation and internalization of external knowledge 
to increase its own knowledge base. In both organizational knowledge creation and 
network theory, there are nevertheless still unsolved questions of tacit knowledge 
transfer.  
 
One of the controversies with regard to transfer of tacit knowledge in recent years has 
been whether or not use of ICT can make up for proximity limitations. Some are 
confident that ICT through promotion of written practices can advance codification of 
know-how and at the same time increase the sociability of all involved in the transfer 
process (Cohendet, et al., 1999), implicitly meaning that any type of knowledge can be 
codified and made universally accessible.  
 
Morgan has answered to what he calls the ‘death of geography’ thesis in saying that 
‘virtual proximity may well be a surrogate for physical proximity in the context of 
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standardized transactions, but not in the context of transactions which are high in 
complexity, ambiguity and tacitness’ (Morgan, 2004, p. 5). With this he is stating that ICT 
and face-to-face communication will co-evolve as knowledge transfer strategies, 
something that conforms to the complementary personalization and codification 
strategies mentioned earlier. Therefore, although ICT certainly can help strengthen ties 
between geographically dispersed clusters of knowledge, the mere fact that tacit 
knowledge is geographically ‘sticky’ with the individuals possessing it can help explain 
why specialized clusters and regional advantage still exist and thrive, as for instance in 
the well-known Silicon Valley (Brown & Duguid, 2000a) and Zhongguancun. As Brown 
and Duguid (Ibid.) noted, for many years scholars have predicted that technological 
development will provide the necessary means of communication replace clusters21, 
and still this has not happened, which is especially the case in more knowledge-
intensive activities.  
 
This underlines the importance of proximity to develop a shared language (i.e. context), 
something Xerox’ failed capability to discover the potential of making the first personal 
computer elements in the 70’s can demonstrate a sad example of. In that case they 
missed the huge opportunity presented to them due to ‘language’ difficulties between 
dispersed organizational entities (Brown & Duguid, 2000b). Clusters can help facilitate a 
shared language, and a shared language can facilitate knowledge sharing and diffusion, 
and by this promote innovations. The pattern of innovative activities tending to cluster 
has given rise to the concept of a regional innovation system22 (RIS), where all parts 
and aspects of economic structure and institutional set-up affected learning as well as 
                                                        
21 Brown and Duguid draw the line of these kinds of prediction back to Alfred Marshall and his Principles 
of Economics in 1890.   
22 Derived from Christopher Freeman’s (Freeman, 1987) introduction of National Innovation Systems 
(NIS). 
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searching and exploring are included (Asheim & Gertler, 2005). This means that, for a 
RIS to evolve, government and institutions also need to help facilitate and support the 
activities conducted by companies located in the region for clusters to thrive. 
 
However, when opening up a new manufacturing site abroad, the main source of the 
knowledge transferred being intra-organizational codified and tacit knowledge, and a 
firm cannot solely depend on clusters for enhancing its knowledge base. Rather, a firm 
should make use of knowledge developed and shared locally as well as develop access to 
non-local sources of knowledge. As suggested by Bathelt et al. (2004), the local ‘buzz’ 
lets a firm enjoy the learning processes taking place among individuals in clusters by 
just being there, while upholding the channels of communications to other knowledge-
producing outside the region, in what they call ‘global pipelines’, is essential to avoid 
path-dependency. This mix of the local and global captures what I believe is essential for 
firms with manufacturing plants abroad, as these often are situated in manufacturing 
clusters it is important to take advantage of the know-how of workers in the local 
networks already existent and co-evolve AC and competences with its suppliers and 
customers, as well as to nurture the knowledge flows intra-organizationally, transferred 
across long distances.  
 
At the same time it is just as important to not cut the strings to home. Norwegian 
companies are often hesitant to establishing R&D abroad (Narula, 2002), and 
development of products and processes are often originated or coordinated in the R&D 
department, making innovation processes slow and unable to efficiently adapt to 
changing environments abroad unless intra-organizational transfer channels are utilized 
and efficiently managed. Further, due to barriers for foreign R&D activities in China, 
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such as cultural and language difficulties, bureaucracy, piracy of intellectual property 
and so on (Gassmann & Han, 2004), firms in the less R&D intensive manufacturing 
industry have few incentives to conduct R&D abroad even if they wish to, making the 
knowledge transfer flows from “home” even more important to utilize.  
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6 Cultural differences 
 
The important thing is for management to utilize the strengths of the local culture. 
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 58) 
 
Since the publication of Culture’s Consequences in 1980, and later Cultures and 
Organizations: Software of the Mind23 in 1991, Geert Hofstede has become a 
monumental figure within the field of cross-cultural studies by demonstrating that there 
are national and regional groupings that affect the behaviour of societies and 
organizations. After studying a large body of survey data from the IBM Corporation, he 
managed to identify four cultural dimensions that can be measured relative to other 
cultures. Updated versions of the IBM questionnaire have been used to construct the 
Values Survey Module (VSM),24 and later a fifth dimension was also identified.25 The 
results of his research are widely used, and his work has influenced many fields of 
research, such as management, organizational sociology and psychology.  
 
However, in this section, I will first start by briefly explaining how a culture consists of 
individual values and practices, before I dig further into Hofstede’s five dimensions of 
national culture and explain their properties. Later, in the analysis section, I will use 
these five dimensions to see how cultural differences affect the technology transfer 
process of Norwegian companies with manufacturing sites in China. Finally, since most 
of this theoretical section on national culture research will be based exclusively on 
Hofstede, I will present some of the critical research Hofstede’s national culture studies 
                                                        
23 Co-authored with his son, Gert Jan Hofstede. 
24 Different versions of the VSM can be found at: http://geerthofstede.com/research--vsm.aspx  
25 The fifth dimension (long vs. short time orientation) was identified through the Chinese Value Survey 
(CVS), developed by Michael Harris Bond. 
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recently have been subject to before moving on to the research design and method 
section of the thesis. 
 
6.1 Cultural relativism 
 
Central in Hofstede’s studies is the notion of mental programming. This involves the 
notion that, although all individuals have the ability to deviate from expected behaviour, 
the pattern of our acts, the way we think, feel and express our thoughts and feelings, are 
partially predetermined by our culture. As culture is learned, it must be separated from 
the human nature and genes. The human nature is what is universal to all human beings, 
and our basic physical and psychological functioning is decided by it, and this is the 
reason why Hofstede calls it the human ‘operating system’. Further, the personality of an 
individual is a unique set of mental programs, which is partly culturally learned and 
partly inherited from the genes. Culture can be understood as ‘the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group (i.e. a number of 
people in contact with each other) or category (i.e. people who have something in 
common - occupation, age etc.) of people from others’ (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9).  
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FIGURE 6.1. The three levels of mental programming  
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
 
That still leaves culture to be explained in the mental programming of individuals. Our 
culture is acquired from our social environment, and at the core of culture lays values, 
which can be understood as ‘broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs to 
others’ (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 8), and most of our values are acquired from our 
environment already at a young age. This is done by unconsciously absorbing 
environmental influences in the form of practices, which is constituted by symbols, 
heroes and rituals. Using the metaphor of an onion, Hofstede argues that the symbols 
(words, gestures, pictures and objects) are the outermost layer of the onion, meaning 
that symbols easily come and go and that change of symbols are the most superficial in 
terms of practices. Heroes are highly esteemed individuals, contemporary or historical, 
that provide good models for behaviour in a culture. Further, and closest to the ‘core’ of 
the onion (values), lays rituals, which are collective activities that are socially vital (ways 
of greeting, prayer, letting the elderly sit etc.). 
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FIGURE 6.2. The onion. The level of depth the different layers have in a culture. 
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
 
The implications of closeness to the core are how easily the layers can be changed or 
replaced. For instance, symbols are more fluctuating than heroes, and heroes are more 
fluctuating than rituals.  All of these three are practices, which again are more 
fluctuating than values. This is because values are acquired at an early age, and thus 
most of them remain unconscious to their holders. As we grow older, we adopt a more 
conscious way of learning that is focused primarily on attaining new practices, which are 
more changeable.  
 
This implies that even though the world changes, the rapid changes happens in the 
outer, more superficial layers of ‘the onion’, while values, and to some extent also rituals, 
are difficult and slow to change. Thus, it is plausible to argue that cultures ‘re-produce’ it 
self, as the values remain more or less stable from one generation to the next. However, 
as there are a large variety of cultures across the world, there is no denial of the fact that 
cultures gradually do change, meaning that even fundamental values can be altered over 
time, although this happens slowly. The sources of cultural diversity have been brought 
about by major impacts of natural forces and forces of humans, such as climate change, 
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migration, military conquest, trade, and what Freeman (1988) called technological 
revolutions, to mention a few. Throughout history, forces like this have repeatedly 
perpetuated the adaption to the changed local environment and slowly created cultural 
diversity. As the relative scores in the indexes below have remained quite stable over 
time, so it can be expected that cultures change together. 
 
Thus, we have different cultures, and Hofstede argues that the evolvement of nations, 
although they should not be equated with societies, does provide the shared context 
needed to facilitate a common mental programming of their citizens through national 
education systems, common media and shared language. Of course there are cultural 
diversity (minorities) and different degrees of the dimensions within a nation as well, 
yet nations can serve as the most practicable way to collect and analyse data of cultural 
differences. It should be noted, however, that the country scores on the five dimension 
indexes introduced below are relative, and even though they can be used to compare 
societies and nations, this is not to say that one culture is ‘better’ than another in any 
way.  
 
6.2 The dimensions of national cultures 
 
Even if cultures are relative, to measure and compare them is another matter entirely. 
Because values are more stable than practices, they are the presumed measurement for 
comparing cultures. In the developed questionnaire, the questions are aimed at either 
the desirable or the desired in the respondents’ preferences. When asked about the 
desirable, the respondents refer to people in general, and this reflects what kind of place 
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they think the world should be, often in terms of letting the respondents express their 
views on virtue and sin, right and wrong and so on. The answers mirror what the 
respondents believe is ethically right. The desired, on the other hand, reflects what 
people want for them selves, without regard to the desirable. By expressing what we 
want for our selves we move closer to how we behave ourselves, although having to 
choose in real life we might do something different than answered in the questionnaire. 
The desired reflect the practical choices made by the majority. 
 
By looking at answers related to the desirable and the desired with the respondents in 
the mentioned IBM questionnaire, and later in the VSM and CVS surveys, five 
dimensions to a national culture have been identified, and through use of factor analysis 
and mathematics, each of the countries included in the indexes have been given a score. 
I will now explain what these dimensions are and what implications they have for 
human behaviour in their respective cultures.  
 
6.2.1 Power distance 
 
Every society encounters some degree of inequality. This implies that in any given 
society there are some people who possess the power to decide the behaviour of others, 
and that the distribution of power is unequal. Other factors that can contribute to 
inequality are things like wealth, status and respect, although none of these factors 
necessarily are interconnected. Depending on the ideals of the country in question, the 
society as a whole might feel that accepting or mixing these factors is a good or a bad 
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thing, depending on the way inequality is perceived in that society. The way inequality is 
handled in a society depends on to which extent power distance is accepted. 
 
 
Power Distance Index (PDI) Values 
Norway 31 
China 80 
 
TABLE 6.1: PDI Values for Norway and China 
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
 
In this dimension, the power distance index (PDI) has 0 as the lowest possible score in 
low-power-distance countries, and around 100 as the maximum score for large-power-
distance.26 It is important to note that all the scores in the indexes are relative and not 
absolute. As for power distance, within countries there are also different degrees of 
power distance according to occupation and social class.27 Power distance is ‘the extent 
to which the less powerful members of institutions (basic elements of society) and 
organizations (places people work) within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally’ (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 46). As we can see, the power 
distance in China is significantly higher than in Norway. Below, I will focus on the 
implications the high PDI score for China and low PDI score for Norway have for the 
work place. However, it should be noted that the implications elaborated is not an 
                                                        
26 Austria has the lowest PDI score (11), and Malaysia and Slovakia (both 104) scored the highest PDI. 
China ranked as number 12-14, and Norway as number 67-68 out of 74 countries. 
27 Countries that scored high on PDI as a whole had the same perception of power distance with all its 
employees, while in low PDI countries the low-status employees still scored nearly as high as colleagues in 
high PDI countries. This makes high-status employees’ values strongly dependent on nationality, while 
low-status employees scores higher no matter what the country scores as a whole.  
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accurate picture of China and Norway, only general descriptions of the extremes in each 
end of the scale. 
 
In countries with a high PDI, the superiors and subordinates consider them selves to be 
fundamentally unequal; this contributes and justifies organizational structures to be 
hierarchical and centralized. The manager type who will make the employees feel the 
most comfortable and whom they respect the most is what Hofstede terms the 
‘benevolent autocrat’, which acts as a well-meaning father to his or her employees, 
making the superior-subordinate relationship an emotional one. The leadership style in 
high PDI countries is that managers rely on their superiors for instructions and formal 
rules, while subordinates expect to be micro-managed and told what to do. Therefore, 
there are also more supervisors employed in high PDI countries that make sure 
everybody does what they are supposed to. Still, it is expected that the superiors will be 
presented with more privileges and a substantially higher salary than his/her 
subordinates. This is because privileges and status symbols are normal in high PDI 
countries, and because white-collar jobs are more valued than blue-collar jobs. This line 
of thought is consistent further down to the bottom of the organization, and makes 
wages, status symbols and privileges decrease significantly the further down you go.  
 
On the other hand, in low PDI countries like Norway, the inequality of roles in 
hierarchical structures is established for convenience, and organizations are more 
decentralized and flat in structure. The subordinates and superiors are basically equal, 
and the roles are simply pragmatic and can be changed in the future. Further, managers 
are to a large extent expected to consult employees on decisions that affect their work. 
Thus, the ideal manager type is democratic in addition to being resourceful, as they rely 
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more on their own experience and subordinates than their superiors. This makes 
supervisors more superfluous in low PDI countries. Because there are no existential 
differences between superiors and subordinates, manual work has more or less the 
same status as office work, and the range of wage levels are not sizeable, while 
privileges and status symbols are unpopular.  
 
6.2.2 Individualism vs. collectivism 
 
The second dimension identified evolves around whether a member of a society 
identifies him or herself in thought and action as an individual or as part of a group or as 
an. The former can be considered an individualist society, where the nuclear family is 
predominant and individual freedom prevails, while the latter is a collectivist28 society, 
where the extended family, or the ‘in-group’, is the most important. These differences 
can be measured by the individualism index, and this dimension can be understood as 
follows:  
 
Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: 
everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. 
Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are 
integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetimes continue to 
protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 76) 
 
Below are the scores on the individualism index for Norway and China: 
 
                                                        
28 The term ‘collectivist’ bears no political notion what so ever in Hofstede’s research.  
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Individualism Index (IDV) Values 
Norway 69 
China 20 
 
TABLE 6.2: IDV Values for Norway and China 
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
 
In this index, low scores indicate a more collectivist society while a high score indicate a 
society where individualist values are dominant.29 A notion here can be that in 
Hofstede’s research there is a strong negative correlation between PDI and IDV scores, 
meaning that in collectivist cultures where the ‘in-group’ is important, there is usually 
also dependence on power figures. Cultures more independent from ‘in-groups’ will in 
general also be less dependent on power figures. As seen from table 6.2, Norway scores 
relatively high on the individualism index, while China scores relatively low.30 
Underneath are descriptions of how a highly individualistic and a highly collectivist 
society affect the workplace. 
 
In highly individualistic countries, management focus on management of individuals, not 
groups. The relationship between employer and employee is considered a ‘buy-sell’ 
business transaction, and there is a high degree of mobility both intra-organizationally 
and in terms of turnover. This is reflected by incentives and bonuses given according to 
an individual’s performance, and that skills and rules serve as the basis for promotion 
and hiring. As mentioned in the power distance section, it is in low-PDI countries 
expected that managers consult employees, and in high-IDV cultures employees are 
                                                        
29 The USA scored the highest with 91, and Guatemala had the lowest score with 6. 
30 Norway is number 16-17 out of 74 countries in the IDV index, and China is number 56-61. 
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expected to have a private opinion, something that mirrors the negative correlation 
between the two dimensions.  
 
In more collectivist societies, management is management of groups. The relationship 
between employer and employee tend to take on a more moral link where protection is 
offered in return for loyalty, something that corresponds to the ‘benevolent autocrat’ 
relationship mentioned in high-PDI countries. A consequence of managing groups 
instead of individuals is that incentives and bonuses must also be given to the group as a 
whole, as all the employees must be treated as ‘in-group’ members in exchange for their 
loyalty. When it comes to communicating style, speaking directly to employees about 
their performance might lead to what can be considered loss of face.31 Face (mianzi, 
面子) is an especially important concept in Chinese culture, and to save mianzi is 
essential to upholding prestige and dignity in interpersonal relationships in the in-group 
(Buckley & Tan, 2006; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005), thus speaking directly can 
undermine face-saving and cause shame. This makes face-to-face feedback less efficient 
in low-IDV cultures, and more indirect ways of communicating are generally preferred. 
When it comes to hiring, relatives or other in-group members of the employer or 
employees will be given preference. This reflects an aspect of learning in low-IDV 
societies, where the adaption of skills and virtues necessary to be an acceptable group 
member, to fit in, is more important than learning for the sake of wanting to learn. 
 
                                                        
31 A Hong Kong social scientist, David Yau-Fai Ho, has explained that ‘face is lost when the individual, 
either through his action or that of people closely related to him, fails to meet essential requirements 
placed upon him by virtue of the social position he occupies’ (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 89). 
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6.2.3 Masculinity vs. femininity 
 
The name of this dimension is coined at gender roles in society. Men are supposed to be 
assertive, tough, competitive and concerned with achievements outside the home, while 
women are supposed to be more concerned with more tender roles, such as taking care 
of the home, the children and people in general. Of course, there are variations of what 
can be termed masculine and feminine values, actions and professions in different 
cultures, but it is in this dimension where the scores by far were the most consistent in 
being gender specific. However, a masculine society can be understood as: 
 
A society… [where] emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be 
assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be 
more modest, tender, and concerned with quality of life. 
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 120) 
 
In contrast, a society can be termed as feminine when: 
  
… [E]motional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, 
tender, and concerned with the quality of life. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Masculinity Index (MAS) Values 
Norway 8 
China 66 
 
TABLE 6.3: IDV Values for Norway and China 
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
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As the table indicates, there are considerable differences between Norway and China 
also with regard to this dimension, with a high score indicating a masculine society and 
a low score indicating a feminine society.32 Another way of understanding this 
dimension is to think of masculine societies as more dramatically divided between the 
sexes, and feminine societies as more fluid, thus having a more blurry schism between 
gender roles. 
 
Therefore, in highly masculine societies, the management style should be more on 
accord with the mentioned assertive masculine values, with more aggressive and 
decisive leaders. These values also affects employees in the appreciation of resolving 
conflicts by a ‘good fight’ where the strongest and most deserving part wins. On all 
levels, results are stressed and employees are rewarded on a basis of equity according to 
performance. This often leads to what a feminine society perhaps would label as a 
‘workaholic’ environment, as career ambitions for men is compulsory and earning more 
money is valued more than leisure time. Women, on the other hand, have a lower share 
of professional jobs, and to pursue a career is optional. 
 
As for firms and organizations in the opposite feminine societies, management is driven 
more by intuition and attempts to attempts to achieve consensus. Therefore, conflict 
situations are resolved more by negotiation and compromise. This makes the reward 
system less fierce and more based on equality, while the general preference for more 
leisure time over more money is the general opinion with the employees. In feminine 
countries there is a higher degree of participation in professional jobs for women, and to 
pursuit a career is optional for both men and women.  
                                                        
32 In this dimension China ranked as number 11-13, while Norway ranked as number 73 out of 74 
countries included in the MAS index. Slovakia got the highest score (110) and Sweden got the lowest (5). 
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6.2.4 Uncertainty avoidance 
 
This dimension relays how a culture handles the ambiguous and unpredictable. All 
societies face some degree of uncertainty in terms of nature, behaviour of its members 
and what the future brings. This cause of anxiety, and even though anxiety is a personal 
feeling it is often partly shared by others in similar situations, and it can therefore be 
argued that the causes of anxiety and how anxiety is dealt with by the individual 
members of a given society is learned and culturally dependent. As the degree of how 
strongly this is experienced in a culture is at the core of this dimension, uncertainty 
avoidance can be understood as ‘the extent to which the members of a culture feel 
threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations’ (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 167). 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) Values 
Norway 50 
China 30 
 
 
TABLE 6.4: IDV Values for Norway and China 
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
 
As we can see, the difference between Norway and China in this dimension is smaller 
than in the previous three.33 A high score in this index indicates a high degree of 
uncertainty avoidance and a low score indicates a low uncertainty avoidance, and 
                                                        
33 Norway ranks as number 57 in the UAI, with China at number 68-69 (out of 74 countries). Greece has 
the highest score (112) and Singapore has the lowest (8). 
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although the difference is not big, it can be expected that Norwegians in general are 
slightly more anxious than Chinese. I will now explain what implications a high and low 
level of uncertainty avoidance have for a working environment to illustrate the relative 
differences between Norway and China, although it should be noted, as in the previous 
dimensions, that the depicted societies below are extreme and are not identical to the 
actual societies found in Norway and China. 
 
In high-UAI societies, there are many formal and informal laws, rules and regulations to 
control the behaviour of its members and provide relief from anxiety and ambiguity in 
the daily life, even if these often are not followed and are inefficient. Hard workers are 
plentiful high-UAI countries, as being busy offers a way to ventilate or divert anxiety, 
and this also offers financial security in form of higher salary – time is money. Not only 
does financial security count in high-UAI societies, however, as employees are motivated 
by security and belonging offered by long-term stays or careers in one company, 
employees stay longer with a company and change jobs less frequently than in low-UAI 
countries. In addition, there is a need for precise formalizations in organizations, and 
also a strong belief that experts or specialists should perform operations or solve 
technical solutions. Managers in high-UAI countries are more concerned with handling 
daily operations than strategic planning, because these activities are less unstructured 
and ambiguous. Because of the same reasons, organizations in high-UAI countries are 
good at implementing new processes and have less innovation.  
 
On the other hand, in low-UAI societies managers occupy themselves more with 
strategic aspects of businesses. In general, there is more tolerance for ambiguity and 
chaos and there are fewer formal laws and rules to regulate behaviour of employees, 
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although the ones that do exist often are highly followed. Hard work is provided when 
needed in low-UAI countries, but time is a framework for orientation instead of being 
equated to money. There is also a higher degree of turnover, and short-term 
employment is more usual. A more general education is ordinary in low-UAI countries, 
as employees believe common sense can help solve problems, not only specialists. 
Cultures with weak uncertainty avoidance are good at innovating, but as they are not as 
good at implementation, this does often not lead to new products or services.  
 
6.2.5 Long-term vs. short-term orientation 
 
This fifth and last dimension was discovered through the development and use of the 
Chinese Value Survey (CVS), and is the result of the fourth dimension in the CVS not 
being the equivalent to the fourth dimension from the IBM questionnaire (uncertainty 
avoidance). Rather, long-term vs. short-term orientation is based on Confucian values. 
The general differences between the two opposites in this dimension are based on 
norms. In short-term oriented cultures, quick results, spending money, respect for 
traditions, personal stability, social status and ‘face’ are important, while slow results 
from persistence, saving, adapting to changing circumstances, willingness to 
subordinate and shame are important norms in long-term oriented societies. This 
dimension is defined as:  
 
…[L]ong-term orientation (LTO) stands for the fostering of virtues oriented toward future 
rewards – in particular perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term orientation, 
stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present – in particular, respect for 
tradition, preservation of “face”, and fulfilling social obligations. 
(Hofstede & Hofstede 2005, p. 210) 
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Long –Term Orientation Index (LTO) Values 
Norway 44 
China 118 
 
TABLE 6.5: IDV Values for Norway and China 
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
 
As this dimension is based on Confucian values, it may not come as a surprise that, in 
general, Asian countries score high in this dimension. This is underlined by the LTO 
values presented in table 6.5, where China scores significantly higher than Norway,34 
making Chinese considerably more long-term oriented than Norwegians.  
 
In high-LTO countries the main work values include learning, honesty, adapting to new 
circumstances, and self-discipline through hard work. Managers are given more time 
and resources to make their contribution to the organization. Even though funds are 
available because of savings, investments are used as a means of slowly building up 
market positions. So, instead of pursuing immediate results, there is a more long-term 
orientation with regard to profit as well. In doing this, personal networks of 
acquaintances can be utilized for success, something a widely known concept in Chinese 
culture called guanxi (关系) can help illustrate. Guanxi can best be described as a 
fundamental web of interpersonal connections that makes up an inseparable part of 
business, and connects the family sphere to the business sphere (Buckley & Tan, 2006; 
                                                        
34 China tops the table, ranking number one at 118, while Norway ranks number 44. The lowest score 
calculated is for Pakistan at 0 (out of 39 countries). 
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Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). The accumulated capital of guanxi with suppliers, 
customers and business partners is not something that would easily be traded off for 
short-term profit, but rather be used for long-term results. 
 
In low-LTO societies, the work values of importance are freedom, rights, achievement 
and thinking for one self. As there is a small saving rate, investments are often made in 
mutual funds, and as bottom line numbers are the lifelines of managers, there are higher 
demands for immediate results. Low-LTO societies have a clearer division between the 
family and business spheres, and as there are rewards for abilities personal loyalties 
vary with business need.  
6.3 Critique of Hofstede’s national culture research 
 
After giving an introduction of culture and the five cultural dimensions in this section, it 
is shortly time to elaborate on the research design and method chosen in this thesis. 
First, however, I will briefly address some of the critique aimed at Hofstede’s cross-
cultural research, to demonstrate that it is not without controversy he has published his 
theories. 
 
In an article by McSweeney (2002), he lounges at parts of the management disciplines 
for the criteria they display in accepting evidence that is not nearly good enough. By this 
he refers to the quanta of data and accuses Hofstede for being manipulative with 
statistics. In his opinion, the cultural analysis made by Hofstede claims more than it can 
justify, and he believes Hofstede has an agenda to ‘prove’ his beliefs. Further, 
McSweeney argues that nations are not anywhere near as uniform as Hofstede believes. 
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Another critical article written by Ailon (2008), he tries to tear apart Hofstede’s logic in 
previous publications by deconstructing the assumptions made and the logic displayed 
in his theories. There are also several reminders in the article about conflicting theory 
and methodology, as he tries to awaken critical reading of Hofstede’s research.
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7 Research design and method 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, my main goal of writing on this topic is 
to shed light on the cultural aspects of technology transfer. After living in China for two 
and a half years, I have with my own eyes witnessed and experienced many of the 
difficulties that can arise in cross-cultural interaction, and I also have first and second-
hand experience with ways cultural and communicative difficulties and 
misunderstandings can affect Western companies doing business in China. Thus, after 
being introduced to knowledge and technology transfer literature through the ESST 
master programme I was surprised by how cultural differences to a large part had been 
neglected in theory on international technology and knowledge transfer. Therefore, I 
decided to write a thesis that could confirm the hypothesis that a transfer process is not 
only dependent on technology and knowledge transfer strategies, but also on how 
cultural differences affect the process, and in doing this perhaps be able to provide a 
thesis that can help fill a gap in the literature.  
 
In this section, I will first clarify how the theoretical framework for looking at this 
phenomenon was constructed, then I will explain why a qualitative study have been 
chosen and how I chose sources for empirical data, and how I proceeded in gathering it. 
Finally, I will discuss strengths and limitations of the research design and method and 
ethical aspects of conducting case studies. 
 
7.1 Theoretical framework 
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Technology transfer is a phenomenon that can be studied from several different aspects. 
The main reason why I have chosen to view technology transfer as a knowledge transfer 
process is because, as I see it, transfer of knowledge and building up a local knowledge 
base is the decisive factor for successfully establishing of new manufacturing sites 
abroad. Originally, I was going to let the intra-organizational knowledge transfer 
interaction be the main emphasis of my thesis to demonstrate the effect cultural aspects 
have on technology transfer. However, as I started reading more relevant literature on 
the topic and spoke to informants during data collection, I increasingly became 
conscious about cultural aspects affecting technology transfer not only internally in the 
firm, but also externally in interaction with the local network of suppliers, customers 
and authorities. Thus, I expanded the theoretical framework to include more external 
factors as well. As there is no ‘recipe’ for looking at technology transfer, and it might not 
be possible to find any universal transfer indicators (Amesse & Cohendet, 2001, p. 653), 
I have gathered theory from the core literature on knowledge and technology transfer, 
covering key internal and external aspects of the phenomenon, and supplemented it 
with relevant literature mentioned in the core literature, or often also suggested by my 
supervisor or fellow students.  
 
Using Hofstede’s cross-cultural research as the framework for incorporating the cultural 
aspects to technology transfer theory was decided after discussions with a post doc 
employee at the Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture at the University of Oslo. 
This framework was found befitting as it is the most developed guideline of looking at 
the relative differences between national cultures in existing cross-cultural theory, and 
can easily be applied to indicate the relative positions of Norway and China by looking at 
the dimension value indexes. The cultural framework has contributed by giving me a 
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more theoretical perspective on what factors to look for and expect when collecting 
data, and provided a means for theorize the experiences expressed by the data 
collection.  
 
However, as already pointed out, cultures are relative and there are variations within 
countries. Thus, a qualitative analysis does not always correspond to the research by 
Hofstede, and this is especially something to consider for my thesis, since I am not 
looking directly at national values, but rather on personal views of national values 
expressed implicitly through certain members of firms. As organizational values are 
developed later in life and are more related to more superficial practices (Hofstede & 
Hofstede, 2005, p. 284), this might cause confusion between national and organizational 
values. Due to time and geographical limitations, however, looking more in depth on 
how cross-cultural employees in organizations affect the organizational cultures in the 
firms use is for other academics to research. Therefore, I have decided to presume that 
the employees in the firms that serve as sources for my empirical data have values that 
in large part correspond to the national values indexes of the country they are from, and 
I use this as a platform to look at how technology transfer is affected by cultural 
differences.  
 
7.2 Designing the thesis and choosing method 
 
In my thesis, I have decided to take a qualitatively perspective on how cultural aspects 
affect technology transfer. Choice of research design should be decided by the research 
question, and as my research question (‘how’) is explanatory and focused on a set of 
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contemporary events, a case study is a good strategy to pursue (Yin, 2009). Further, in 
this thesis I look at technology transfer processes, and in doing so it is often required to 
perform a qualitative analysis, as quantitative data, as input-output numbers, are 
insufficient to properly evaluate and analyse a transfer process (Autio & Laamanen, 
1995). Especially cultural influence is difficult to quantify, and a cultural phenomena can 
best be given attention by conducting case studies (Ragin, 1994, ch. 4). A qualitative case 
study can be defined as: 
 
…[A]n empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident. 
(Yin, 2009, p. 18) 
 
As the phenomenon of Norwegian firms establishing manufacturing sites in China is a 
highly contemporary one, and the context of cultural differences affecting the 
technology transfer involved is not clearly evident, it is reasonable to conduct a 
qualitative analysis. 
 
In the thesis, a multiple-case design is used, and when conducting a multiple-case design 
each cases should be selected so that it either predicts similar results or contrasting 
results for anticipatable reasons (Yin, 2009). Already early on in the design process I 
decided to look at Norwegian firms’ manufacturing sites in China. This is because 
primary activities are more central in a firm’s strategy and more vital for its competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1985),35 and I expected firms that offshore primary activities to 
provide more support and backup in terms of resources and time than firms moving 
                                                        
35 See Porter (1985) for classifications primary activities and support activities.  
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support activities abroad, something that might reduce practical difficulties associated 
with the technology transfer process in itself.  
 
For this reason I have been in contact with several Norwegian firms with manufacturing 
sites located in China. Many turned me down, but after searching for firms a long time I 
came over an industrial park owned by Norwegian in Ningbo, China, called Nordic 
Industrial Park (NIP).36 Here, the primarily Nordic firms that want to establish 
themselves in China can receive help for both practical and cultural problems that 
potentially can affect the technology transfer process. In order to decrease the number 
of cultural variables in the thesis, I only tried to get NIP’s Norwegian customers to assist 
me in providing empirical data, although I wanted the cases for my thesis to still be 
relatively inexperienced in their Chinese operations, so that any cultural problems 
hopefully had yet to be properly solved.  
 
After getting approval from the General Manager of NIP to interview him, I also 
managed to get the top leaders in four Norwegian firms located in NIP to participate as 
interview objects and sources of empirical data. As these firms operate in different 
industries, have different maturity in terms of the technology they use and have 
different complexity in their operations I would expect them to provide contrasting 
results in the analysis. However, if I should find similarities in their experiences of 
opening up manufacturing sites in China, it could well be possible that the empirical data 
can shed light on cultural difficulties associated with the technology transfer process.  
 
                                                        
36 For more information on NIP, see the empirical section.  
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After the initial contact had been made with the Norwegian firms, and the Norwegian 
top managers in each firm had agreed to contribute to the thesis by being interviewed, I 
started working on the interview guide (appendix A), and the same interview guide was 
used in all four in-depth interviews. Here, it should be noted that prior to interviewing 
the Norwegian top leaders in the firms, I had conducted two exploratory in-depth 
interviews with the CEO of NIP, and the CFO of NIP and CEO of NIP Service, in addition 
to the GM of the Norwegian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (NCCC), and a managing 
partner in a consultant agency that works with helping firms adjust to cross-cultural 
working environments. The information provided by these informants was helpful to 
form the interview guide for the top leaders for the manufacturing firms, and in addition 
to my own experiences from China, this has also let me have reflexivity toward the 
information provided by the cases. As it showed, however, two of the firms have been 
considered as not being far enough along the establishment phase of setting up the site 
and have no or very little manufacturing in China, and as a result they have been 
rejected as cases in this thesis. Therefore, I have ended up with having two cases in this 
thesis, namely Marine Aluminium and Mascot Power Supplies.   
 
7.3 Validation and reliability 
 
In a case study as well as in other designs of research, the quality of the design is 
essential, and to ensure the quality of the empirical research tests of validity and 
reliability in the case study can be used. There are four relevant tests that can be used 
for quality assurance, three regarding validity, and one regarding reliability (Yin, 2009).  
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To increase the first, construct validity, I will use multiple sources of evidence. As I am 
conducting a two-case study, I believe that this should ensure the validity of my findings. 
It can be argued that I should have interviewed several people in each of the firms, as 
the empirical data collected from each of the firms perhaps is rather one sided and the 
data provided by them will not be verified from other sources. It can also be argued that 
I should have used Chinese employees as sources to bring a Chinese perspective on the 
cultural aspects into the thesis.  
 
Although I believe that both objections are good, I must add that I have tried to 
interview the two Chinese production supervisors, and that both interviews was not 
fruitful in providing usable empirical data, and the idea and already collected data was 
abandoned on an early stage. This can perhaps be studied as an example of cultural 
differences in it self, and as there in all the cases only is one Norwegian expatriate 
working at each of the manufacturing sites, I ended up with only one source of empirical 
data from each of the firms, although data found on the internet supplemented this. The 
two rejected cases have also provided useful data in that they have increased my 
understanding of the two selected cases. Therefore, I believe, as mentioned above, that it 
is sufficient validation if the two interviews show a pattern for cultural difficulties. 
Further, I have transcribed all the interviews and sent them to the informants for 
approval, something that in several cases have led to clarification and elaboration on 
topics brought up in the interviews.  
 
In the second test, internal validity, it is important to do establish a causal relationship. 
To do this, I have used constructed a theoretical framework to build explanations for the 
topic of my thesis, and looked for patterns in the empirical data verify it. The third test, 
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external validity, implies generalization of the results to some broader theory. As I have 
constructed the analytical framework used in this thesis and research on how cultural 
aspects influence a technology transfer processes is little developed, I do not expect the 
findings in this thesis to be generalized and used as a set framework in other studies of 
the topic. However, I do hope my thesis can contribute to shed light on the gaps in the 
literature, and be used as a small step on the way to developing a framework for doing 
research on the topic. 
 
The final test, validity, involves demonstrating how the thesis was constructed and 
conducted so that it can be replicated with the same results. By providing rich 
descriptions of the theoretical framework used in this thesis, and in this section explain 
how I have proceeded in developing it, the theoretical procedures are in place for 
replication of the study. By explaining how and where I gathered the empirical data and 
presenting the interview guide as an appendix, the empirical procedures of the study are 
in place for replication, and the reliability of the thesis should be strengthened.   
 
After presenting and justifying research design and method used in this thesis, I will in 
the next section present the cases and analyse the empirical findings to see if this 
corresponds to the theory introduced.  
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8 Empirical findings and analysis 
 
In this section, I will introduce the sources for empirical data, while at the same time 
present my findings with regard to technology transfer. By doing this I hope to find out if 
the cross-cultural perspective from section 6 can bring any contributions to the 
innovation-oriented approach to technology transfer in the analysis section. First, I will 
present the context of which the two cases conduct their Chinese operations in, namely 
Nordic Industrial Park, and elaborate on the services they offer their customers. Then, I 
will briefly introduce the Chinese endeavours of the Marine Aluminium and Mascot 
Power Supplies, before moving on to the empirical analysis of this thesis. There, I will 
discuss in depth what the findings involve and link them up with the theory explained 
earlier in the thesis. As a framework to look at this topic of this thesis is non-existent, I 
will in the analysis section review theory introduced in the technology transfer sections 
3, 4 and 5, and discuss what cultural implications the national value scores from the 
different dimension indexes have for technology transfer in the context of the two 
Norwegian firms.  
 
As mentioned, there are cultural variations not only between nations, but also within 
and between organizations, especially when a firm employs people from different 
nations they cannot assume common values with its employees (Hofstede & Hofstede, 
2005, p. 286), but organizational culture is only considered implicitly in this thesis by 
the national values possessed by the employees of an organization. However, using the 
scores from the mentioned indexes might provide good explanations for findings in the 
empirical section. In addition to analyse the cultural differences’ implications for the 
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transfer, I will address some of the practical implications of transferring technology to 
China from Norway.   
 
8.1 The context – Nordic Industrial Park 
 
The proximity to the greater Shanghai (上海) area and the ocean makes Ningbo (宁波), 
with its urban population close to 2,5 million, a central and practical location for 
business activities in China, both for domestic as well as foreign-related firms. After its 
formal establishment in Ningbo in 2002, the history of the Norwegian owned Nordic 
Industrial Park (NIP) started when they became fully operational on the 1st of January 
2004.  
 
One of the main assets of the eight expatriates and almost 70 Chinese working for NIP is 
their accumulated experience from running and facilitating for businesses in China and 
their know-how with the Chinese culture and system. In addition to renting out 
property, they also offer services including company registration, recruitment of 
personnel, financial/accounting, ICT-services, legal assistance and more general 
consultant services to their (for the most part) Nordic customers. With their main goal 
being to provide assistance to small and medium sized businesses (SMB) for an easy 
entry to China, they now have an still increasing number of around 50 firms located in 
the industry park, most of which from different industries, operating in different 
markets and with different strategic motivations for establishing themselves in NIP. 
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After helping many firms register in China over the years, the NIP can make sure all legal 
documents, official permissions and registrations are in place by the time their 
customers arrive NIP, and as this process might be difficult to manoeuvre in for 
inexperienced firms, most of their customers choose to buy this service from NIP. And 
after arrival at NIP, the customers receive a consultation on how to cope with the 
cultural challenges associated with operating and doing business in China, or what NIP 
themselves refer to as ‘Chinese factors’.  
 
These ‘Chinese factors’ has a lot to do with communication style. This does not 
necessarily have anything to do with linguistic challenges, rather, NIP stress the 
importance of not putting too much emphasis on English proficiency. As an NIP 
informant told me during an interview, at arrival in China a Norwegian leader should 
see him or herself as being blind, deaf and mute, at that the Chinese management team 
will serve as his/her eyes, ears and mouth. In NIP’s opinion, it is important to balance 
the management team between recruiting people with good language skills and 
recruiting people with good professional skills, so that key personnel can fill all of these 
different roles accordingly. NIP work hard at creating employees that act as ‘cultural 
hybrids’, where an imprinted ‘western’ mind-sett makes the employees capable of 
efficiently communicating with both Norwegians and Chinese. The consultant service 
NIP offer is in other words also highly focused on cultural factors, and the services NIP 
provide to their customers and the vision they have for their industrial park all imply 
that it is not easy for SMBs without any previous encounters from China to establish 
them selves there, for both practical and cultural reasons.  
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It might be expected that NIP customers experience a smoother transition phase when 
establishing production in China than other firms. The services NIP offer can perhaps 
help decrease the effect of cultural differences between Norway and China would have 
on technology transfer for their costumers, and although it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it can be expected that firms establishing themselves without assistance in China 
would encounter more difficulties due to lack of experience with operating on Chinese 
soil. As mentioned in section 7, I believe that any findings of cultural difficulties affecting 
NIP customers’ technology transfer processes would be more valid than if the firms 
established a manufacturing site in China on their own.  
 
8.2 Marine Aluminium  
 
In December 2008, Marine Aluminium (MA) moved in to NIP, in order to be closer to 
their markets in Asia and to enjoy the spoils of low-cost labour. Already in April 2009 
they started production at their new manufacturing site, and their goal is for the Ningbo 
branch to become the largest manufacturer of helicopter landing pads (helipads) in Asia, 
offering a large variety of products that are welded into components in NIP and shipped 
out to their customers. Today, MA’s Ningbo plant employ 20 people, where the General 
Manager (GM), who has been there since the establishment in NIP, is the only 
Norwegian, whereas the rest are Chinese.  
 
After recruitment of key personnel was done through NIP’s recruitment service, the GM 
developed a mutual understanding with them of what was needed from future 
employees and they started handling the recruitment process them selves. Since the 
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technologies used in MA’s production processes are mature37, new employees should 
be able to obtain necessary skills through training. Even if they lack the required level of 
detailed knowledge, newly hired employees usually have the general level of knowledge 
needed for training and practicing on how to perform the work tasks. Since beginning in 
NIP, MA has fired five employees lacking the required skills for the job. The most 
important qualities with applicants when recruiting are a right attitude in terms of being 
on time, being loyal and trustworthy are seen as. As a result of this, MA has in their 
search for right people to fill positions increasingly started to hire people their current 
employees know from before and recommend.  
  
Money and status are pointed out as the most important motivating factors for the 
employees. For instance, the MA employees seem to like the creative pay system with a 
base salary complemented by bonuses related to performance, absence, and 
compensation for travel expenses. However, as most conflict situations at the work place 
derive out of reward and prestige issues economic factors can also be a disturbing 
factor. The GM of MA is firm about inviting all the workers to official celebrations and 
also arranges gatherings for employees and their families twice a year, something that is 
well received. This is viewed as a platform for creating and showing mutual respect, as 
this kind of interaction between co-workers is not so usual in China. 
 
Starting as a welder in MA 27 years ago, the GM is familiar with all aspects of the 
technologies used and knowledge needed to perform the different operations at the 
manufacturing site. In the beginning, the GM personally trained all the newly hired 
employees, followed by practical training where the newly hired employees tried and 
                                                        
37 MA’s first helipad delivery was in 1974. 
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failed on their own. Due to practical difficulties like time limitations and 
communicational difficulties (language problems), however, trained employees have 
taken over as continuators of firm competences and handle the training of new 
employees, although the GM still contributes if needed. When implementing complex 
processes, specialist transferors are sent from the back office to provide assistance with 
instructions, routines and HSE-regulations and so on, and these implementations have 
been evaluated as successful. 
 
New designs for helipads are sent from the R&D department located in Norway to the 
manufacturing site in Ningbo, where the GM works as an ‘intermediate’ between a 
project leader in charge of the project located in Norway and the production supervisor 
in Ningbo. After going through the blueprints with the production supervisor, quality 
checks supervision in a more hands-on manner still have to be conducted frequently in 
the production process to ensure that the helipads fulfil expected standards, due to the 
skilled but relatively inexperienced MA employees. However, if something is unclear 
about the work operation, the Chinese employees will not necessarily bother to ask for 
assistance of clarifications, this can also be a cause for repeated mistakes because the 
routines are not yet fully implemented and the workers work fast and hard. 
 
Concerning business networks, the GM also believes there is more socializing with 
suppliers, customers and authorities than previously experienced in Norway. In order to 
show respect, it is important to ‘wine and dine’ them and get to know each other, while 
the meetings with them often can be experienced as filled with hard negotiations. 
However, when doing business, customers and suppliers often request that blueprints 
and drawings are handed out, something that in some occasions have caused suspicions 
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of violated intellectual property rights (IPR). Another factor to consider is problems 
finding suppliers with internationally approved certifications and documentation. 
  
8.3 Mascot Power Supplies 
 
After registering and establishing the firm in the autumn of 2007, Mascot moved in and 
started up their facilities in NIP in the beginning of 2009. The firm is a manufacturer of 
power supplies and battery chargers, both custom and standard made. Their main 
motivation for establishing manufacturing in NIP was cost saving, and so far the firm has 
been producing semi products, although their plans for NIP is to get finished products 
(both standard and custom made) into their production line sometime in 2011. As of 
today, there are 17 employees working at their site, whereas one Norwegian GM and 
while Chinese fill the rest of the positions.  
 
After filling the first couple of key positions through NIP’s recruitment service, they have 
hired all the remaining employees on their own. On two separate trips, key management 
personnel (they all speak English) have been sent to production sites in Europe for 
training and to see how the production operations worked at experienced and well-
functioning sites. Afterwards, there has also been also a lot follow-up communication 
over mail and telephone as a supplement. When the production management has 
reached a satisfactory level, Mascot started recruiting production workers. Normally a 
production worker receives is trained by the production managers for one month before 
entering full work. Additional recruitment to vacant positions is usually announced 
locally, but if the requirements for a position are high they might increase the range of 
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the search. Mascot’s production operations in NIP are not so complicated, and the firm 
can use on existing routines after being in the industry for a long time. There have also 
been specialist engineers from Norway visiting the manufacturing site to review 
routines, adapt instructions and so on. Nevertheless, problems do occur, and after 
starting up in NIP, Mascot has fired two people because of showing incompetence at 
work.  
 
According to Mascot, their employees are eager to learn, but because they have big 
respect for superiors they have some troubles opening up and being creative. To cure 
this, the GM and the management emphasise communication, meetings and talking 
openly with the employees. Satisfied and happy employees are seen as a key to the firm 
doing well, and by giving the employees respect they hope this will be reciprocated. 
However, the GM states that the most important factor for satisfied employees is salary, 
and as NIP’s customers in general have a higher level of salaries than their local 
counterparts they hope this can contribute to the well being of their employees as well. 
 
One of the reasons Mascot have experienced some difficulties is because they outsource 
a great number of the components used in their products. As they cannot approve of 
suppliers locally, they have to give potential suppliers specifications for a component 
they want produced, and when they receive the component, they have to send it to the 
R&D department located in Norway to approve both the component and supplier there. 
Sometimes this process can drag on, by the Norwegian R&D department disapproving 
the component or sending out new specifications, and then the whole process has to be 
repeated. As the already approved suppliers regularly mark the shipments wrong, send 
out wrong products or other things, this require extensive quality controls, and take up 
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resources locally in Ningbo. Most of Mascot’s customers are based in the USA and 
Europe, so there is little contact with them directly from the manufacturing site in 
Ningbo.  
 
8.4 Discussion of findings in the empirical data 
 
After presenting the findings of the data collection for the thesis, it is time to analyse 
them in the proposed framework of combining an innovation-oriented approach to 
technology transfer with Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. In table 9.1, a summary of the 
national value scores of Norway and China is provided.  
 
 National Values  
Dimension 
Index 
PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Norway 31 67-68 69 16-17 8 73 50 57 44 13-14 
China 80 12-14 20 56-61 66 11-13 30 68-69 118 1 
PDI – Power Distance Index UAI – Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
IDV – Individualism Index LTO – Long-Term Orientation Index 
MAS – Masculinity Index 
 
TABLE 8.1: All Dimension Values and Ranks for Norway and China38 
Source: Based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
 
8.4.1 Organizational knowledge creation – culturally revisited  
 
                                                        
38 All the cultural dimensions have 74 countries included in their indexes, except from the LTO index 
where 39 countries are included.  
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When it comes to building up competence, it has been mentioned that the first step of 
setting up a new manufacturing site is to recruit the right personnel. As suggested in 
section 5, the level of tacit knowledge possessed by individuals is difficult to assess, and 
there is reason to believe that language barriers will amplify these difficulties in a 
recruitment process. Further, it is not only the tacit and explicit knowledge bases with 
the applicants that need to be considered, but also how the compatibility of the Chinese 
employees with that of the Norwegian company, because ‘when companies go 
international, their planning and control systems continue to be strongly influenced by 
their national culture’ (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 256), and therefore it can be 
expected that employees need to demonstrate willingness to adapt to the ‘Norwegian’ 
environment of the work place. Perhaps for this reason, MA will often rather trust the 
judgement of their employees who knows what is needed to work for MA, both 
professionally and culturally. As the employees already are part of an in-group (low 
IDV), it seems likely that if they bring someone not qualified to fill a position or without 
the cultural adaptiveness needed, as they can end up with losing face, something they 
will strongly try to avoid. This corresponds to the ‘cultural hybrids’ NIP work so hard to 
create, and also the reason why Mascot often have four rounds of interviews before 
hiring. 
 
With regard to organizational knowledge creation, there are several aspects potentially 
affected by cultural differences. As the tacit compound of knowledge contains ‘mental 
models’ in the form of individual beliefs and viewpoints, it can seem as though culturally 
learnt values that are part of out mental programming can influence how knowledge is 
interpreted. As for explicit knowledge, the transfer of codified knowledge can be 
impeded by language difficulties, as the need for a ‘common language’ not only demands 
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a shared context and environment to decode knowledge, but an actual oral language 
needs to be shared in order to create a platform for speeding up the transfer process. 
However, although language difficulties can contribute to cultural misperception, it 
should not be confused with cultural difficulties (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, ch. 9). In 
both cases, most of the management were proficient in English, something that can be 
expected to increase mutual understanding of knowledge through a shared context. 
Nevertheless, language difficulties can serve as a filter of information and knowledge 
needed for efficiently converting knowledge if too few people in an organization can 
communicate with each other.  
 
As for commitment, the point of creating a shared context also applies here. Without this 
it is difficult to create a purposeful environment for the employees, as they are unable to 
conceptualize the new information. However, according to Hofstede’s research, what 
constitutes a purposeful environment is not universal for all cultures. As China has a 
high PDI score, the manager who acts as the benevolent father can be expected to be the 
ideal for Chinese employees, something that contrasts an expected preference for 
democratic leader types by Norwegians. The democratic leader in a flatter Norwegian 
company structure might be able to provide more autonomy to the employees of the 
firm, but this is not necessarily the right strategy to pursue in China, as workers in high-
PDI countries expect to be told what to do. This might prove Nonaka somewhat wrong in 
that autonomy increases an individual’s self-motivation. Even though both MA and 
Mascot focused on creating a purposeful environment for its employees through 
respectful treatment of employees, and a shared context through socializing and 
communication, it was in both cases pointed out that money was the primary motivation 
for Chinese employees. This suggests that the benevolent father also is a generous one. 
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Therefore, it seems as though, while autonomy might increase the intrinsic motivation 
with individualistic Norwegian workers, Chinese workers are more dependent on 
extrinsic motivation provided by leaders giving assertive direction and stimulation in 
terms of prestige, privileges and economic compensation39. This is also related to the 
high MAS of China, where money and status can seem to be a more important 
motivation for performing a job than for Norwegians. It can also be expected that for a 
Norwegian leader to earn the loyalty of Chinese employees, it is important to treat the 
employees as one group (low IDV score for China) to easier create a shared context with 
the employees.  
 
In converting knowledge between individuals of the organization, especially the Mascot 
case referred to Chinese workers as eager to learn. As both MAS (career ambitions) and 
LTO (learning and adapting to new circumstances among main work values) are 
significantly higher in China than in Norway, it could be expected that knowledge 
conversion in general is a welcome concept for the hardworking (high MAS) and 
disciplined (high PDI) Chinese employees working for Mascot. However, the motivations 
for converting and learning are different and have to be spurred more actively by 
managers and supervisors due to the high PDI score, something that corresponds to the 
initiatives for getting the Chinese employees to open up and be more creative through 
meetings and better communication can affirm. It can be expected that the DUI-mode of 
innovation, where socialization is central, might present some difficulties as Chinese 
expect to be told what to do instead of learning by themselves. In the MA case, however, 
it seemed as though the learning process complies with this form of learning. This is 
                                                        
39 Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are defined in section 3.2. 
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perhaps because of the GM’s attributes fulfilling, if not surpassing, the requirements as a 
‘transferor’ of technology. When the production workers have a GM that can perform 
their job as good, if not, better than them, it is to be expected that they will do their 
uttermost to improve their skills, especially when their superior tells them to. This 
seems to be on accord with the statement by one of my informants that a firm should 
send the one who hurts the most when establishing themselves abroad.  
 
However, there could be some pit falls that can obstruct or slow down the conversion 
process in Chinese culture. Because a leader decides the level of skills needed to be part 
of the ‘in-group’ at the work place (i.e. an employee, although ‘in-group’ also contain 
emotional connotations), this of course affects the motivation for and quality of 
knowledge conversion, as these standards might require the employees to adopt skills 
that necessitates performance what high-MAS Chinese consider to be ‘feminine’ tasks or 
operations, or work tasks considered by high-PDI Chinese to be below their professional 
status.  
8.4.2 The transmitter – culturally revisited 
 
In terms of the personalization and codification strategy, it is not difficult to agree with 
statement that the more knowledge is codified, the easier its absorption will be (Amesse 
& Cohendet, 2001; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and after reviewing relevant literature in 
section 4 it can be expected that this strategy will be widely employed in technology 
transfer processes, as have been confirmed by both the cases in this thesis. Use of the 
codification strategy when Norwegian companies open up manufacturing sites in China, 
however, involves some problematic aspects not considered so far in the thesis. First of 
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all, when transferring codified knowledge between Norway and China it is imperative 
that all manuals, routines, procedures, and so on, are correctly translated, so that 
nothing essential is left or filtered out in the process, something that can slow down the 
transfer process significantly and also increase transfer costs. This might be difficult if 
routines need adaption to the local environment in China as well, since such alterations 
are difficult to conduct beforehand without testing them out properly, both practically 
and culturally. For instance, after arriving NIP Mascot has slightly altered their routines 
to be more static and monotone so that multi-tasking could be avoided. This can be 
linked together with a high PDI where workers prefer to be told what to do, and not 
have to take initiative as to how to solve their job tasks.  
 
Transfer of new codified knowledge created in China can also be impeded if not 
translated properly. In both cases new knowledge had to be sent to a Norwegian R&D 
department for approval, due to non-existent local R&D departments. Therefore, firms’ 
general display of ‘inertia’ in R&D internationalization can of course contribute to 
impede knowledge flows (Narula, 2002). However, cultural factors also play a role in 
firm’s R&D strategies. In addition to a high PDI, China’s high LTO score indicates 
pragmatism and adaptiveness in dealing with others through use of guanxi, and these 
two factors imply a relatively high degree of corruption in China (Hofstede & Hofstede, 
2005, p. 352). The low Chinese IDV score indicates that taking care of the in-group is 
important and that laws and rights differ for some categories of people, even though 
China’s low UAI score should contribute to lower corruption by having fewer laws that 
are being kept (Ibid.) This might be a slight contradiction in the case of the Chinese 
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culture, as it somewhat collides with Hofstede’s theory,40 although there are strong 
indications for problems in China with IPR to derive from economic poverty and the fact 
that existing laws still have not been in use for long (Gassmann & Han, 2004).  
 
Due to high costs, the personalization strategy is perhaps not so widely used in 
international technology transfer. During data collection for this thesis, one informant 
nevertheless told me about the Japanese firm Toshiba’s establishment of a 
manufacturing site just outside of Hangzhou (杭州) in China. In the start-up process they 
sent 300 Japanese from a factory in Japan with instructions that they could leave as soon 
as the Chinese employees hired to fill their position in Hangzhou had reached a 
satisfying level. Of course, only large firms with abundant resources can pursue a 
personalization strategy that intense and costly. On the other hand, as discussed in 
section 5, ICT alone cannot be expected to replace face-to-face interaction completely. 
Rather, as found in the cases, use of experienced transfer teams for diffusing specialized 
knowledge when needed, coupled with considerable involvement of expatriates at the 
manufacturing site and extensive training of key personnel in the back office can be 
expected to be the main transfer mechanisms in utilization of this strategy, (Bruun & 
Bennett, 2002).  
 
In using this strategy, there is also the possibility of transferors and expatriates 
experiencing ‘culture shock’ in China (and elsewhere), where the foreign cultural 
environment can be seen a negative and this can lead to hostility toward the new 
environment (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, ch. 9). Although Norwegians with a low UAI 
                                                        
40 China was number 79 on the 2009 Worldwide Corruption Perceptions ranking of countries, with 
Norway ranked at number 11 (Transparency-International, 2010). 
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score might be less prone to such experiences than many other national cultures, 
individualists often consider their mental programming as superior to collectivist 
thinking (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 106). If these scenarios occur, it might be 
difficult for the expatriates to treat the Chinese employees according to the local societal 
norms and adapting to the local environment.  
 
8.4.3 The receiver – culturally revisited 
 
As for the integration mechanisms of knowledge mentioned earlier, the first, rules and 
directives, can be expected to be an efficient way of implementing organizational 
knowledge due to the generally low UAI score of China, indicating that Chinese (as 
Norwegians) are used to fewer formal laws that are highly followed. Due to other factors 
already discussed, however, China has a relatively high rate of corruption in its society, 
and this can also indicate that employees might be inclined to bypass internal rules and 
directives as well. There have been no indications from the empirical data that this is a 
problem at the work place, although a perhaps because there are more supervisors in 
China, and this might have a preventive effect.  
 
The second, sequencing, is an implementation mechanism that members of cultures 
with high PDI and high MAS scores probably is most comfortable with. In high-PDI 
countries, there is a competitive advantage in terms of discipline, while there in high-
MAS countries are competitive advantages with regard to mass production and 
efficiency (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 345), and these are all required abilities in 
sequencing. This mechanism for implementing knowledge thus seems to suit Chinese 
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workers well. However, as the MA case showed, there are possible pit falls in terms of 
large quanta of flawed products if the production process is not supervised in a hands-
on manner. As the third mechanism, routines, contains qualities of both the previous 
two mechanisms, this can also be expected to fit well with Chinese workers. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in the analysis of codification, there is a possibility that 
routines need to be adapted to the local work culture. 
 
Finally, group problem solving and decision-making, might match well with the 
innovative qualities associated with low UAI score of both Norway and China. However, 
even though Chinese workers like to be treated as in-group, this does not mean they are 
comfortable with this concept. Due to their high PDI score and low IDV score, Chinese 
will as mentioned earlier probably have difficulties with expressing their personal views 
instead of being told what to do, making this mechanism better suited for Norwegians 
than Chinese employees, something Mascot’s lack of creative initiative by the employees 
illustrates. However, it can be argued that if the top manager is successful in creating a 
strong enough in-group at the work place, this might help lower the threshold of 
expressing opinions and make utilization of this mechanism more possible, and 
attempts of achieving this have been made in both cases in this thesis.  
 
In the section on developing capabilities, the importance of building absorptive 
capabilities was discussed. Even though the theory and empirical data indicate that the 
possibility of Norwegian firms establishing an R&D department in China is small, 
capabilities still need to be formed locally at the manufacturing site. Both MA and 
Mascot expressed hope for establishing an R&D department in NIP, a strategy that 
would probably increase their local capabilities significantly and contribute to a more 
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dynamic production. Especially Mascot can benefit from establishing R&D department 
to assess suppliers on their own, although MA’s project leaders sitting in Norway also 
seems inconvenient. However, although having a local R&D department to some extent 
can make up for proximity problems, the relatively high degree of corruption in China 
and ‘inertia’ of R&D internationalization will probably unnerve some firms. After looking 
at the suspicions MA has about sharing blueprints with customers and suppliers suggest 
that building open networks for innovation in China is difficult. 
 
Even though R&D also might help the co-development of knowledge with local 
customers and suppliers in such networks, developing personal relationships is also 
important when searching for external knowledge and contacts in China. The concept of 
guanxi has already been defined and explained in section 6, but as it only have been 
associated with corruption so far in the analysis section, the entire concept has perhaps 
a bit undeservingly been painted black. Without doubt, using guanxi for illegal gains is 
wrong; however, the concept can also be used to create extensive networks that by 
providing a means to search for external knowledge can help increase a firm’s 
knowledge base, and thus also absorptive capacity.  
 
The question is whether or not Norwegians with their low LTO have the long-term 
perspective and patience needed to accumulate guanxi with external interpersonal 
connections so that they can benefit from using it, or if Norwegian expatriates stay long 
enough in China for this to develop. As seen from the empirical findings both the firms 
spend much time in dealing with suppliers and customers, but as they have only been in 
China for a relatively short time, it might be too early to say if they have accumulated 
any guanxi with their connections. Rather, the GMs ‘wining and dining’ with customers, 
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suppliers and officials in Ningbo, can perhaps be interpreted as a first step creating an 
‘in-group’ relationship. As ‘in-group’ members in China receive preferential treatment, 
having a personal relationship with the right people can help speed things up in 
business life. Again, I would like to emphasise that this is not the same as to omit 
existing laws and regulations. During the course of writing this thesis, I have myself 
taken part in a meeting between a big Norwegian firm and a Chinese delegation of high-
ranking officials, where they discussed the firm’s possible establishment in a province in 
China. The meeting did not have any outcome; rather it seemed to me that everything 
was arranged so that the two parts could get to know each other before talking business. 
This can perhaps serve as reminder of the importance of personal relationships for 
conducting business in China, either by being part of an in-group or by accumulating 
guanxi in networks. 
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9 Concluding discussion 
 
In this thesis, I have linked the dynamic innovation-oriented approach to technology 
transfer together with cross-cultural research to look at how cultural differences affect 
technology transfer between Norway and China. As there still is no accepted framework 
to combine technology transfer and cultural aspects in research, this has been an 
attempt to demonstrate the importance of incorporating cultural variations into existing 
technology transfer theory. By first introducing a framework for looking at technology 
transfer from an innovation-oriented approach that covers many aspects of the transfer, 
from a micro-level to more of a macro-level and from internal to external knowledge 
flows, we have seen that the proposed cultural framework can contribute by predicting 
and explaining the outcome of the transfer based on the national values of the countries 
involved in the transfer. Although the two cases used as empirical sources in this thesis 
operate in different industries, markets and have different technologies, the findings 
showed many similarities between their situations. Thus, it seems as though the 
innovation-oriented approach and cross-cultural studies can complement each other 
when analysing technology transfer processes between culturally different countries. 
 
With regard to organizational knowledge creation, we have seen that the perception of 
what constitutes a purposeful environment through which a shared context can be 
developed for converting knowledge is different between Norway and China. We have 
also seen that the motivations for Chinese and Norwegian workers are different in 
nature. I have argued for how this affects knowledge conversion, but further research is 
needed in order to draw conclusions.  
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We have seen that the codification and personalization strategy are complementary in a 
transfer, even across far distances such as between China and Norway. However, we 
have also seen that cultural differences can affect the codification strategy negatively, 
obviously language proficiency, or lack of it, can play a role in this, however, adapting 
routines to the local environment might offer problems. We have also seen that cultural 
factors can affect codification in affecting to firms’ incentives for establishing R&D 
departments. I have also argued that although the personalization strategy can 
contribute as a transfer mechanism between Norway and China, it can also contribute 
with negativity and hostility if the transferors experience a culture shock. 
 
Regarding competence building, we have seen that rules and directives, sequencing and 
routines seem to be well-suited integration mechanisms in China, but that group 
problem solving and decision-making does not seem to make Chinese comfortable. 
Developing capabilities are more difficult, however, something my empirical findings 
indicate lack of R&D department contributes to. There are nevertheless other channels 
for building networks in China, such as the concept of guanxi and establishing close, 
personal relationships, but these require time to be built, and it is questionable if 
Norwegians have the patience for this due to low LTO and the notion that Norwegian 
expatriates might not move permanently to China. 
 
Thus, the success of technology transfer depends seems not only to depend on how 
technology is transferred, but where it is transferred from and to can play a role as well. 
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9.1 Limitations with this thesis 
 
As mentioned, this thesis has attempted to take a step toward creating a framework to 
approach the topic of how cultural differences affect technology transfer. However, a 
weakness in my approach is that cultural differences are relative and hard to generalize. 
This means that, even though national values can help predict implications of 
transferring technology between two culturally different countries, this will never be a 
completely accurate framework for conducting research. Further, there are also 
methods for doing research on organizational cultures, and there is a possibility that this 
would provide a more accurate analysis. However, it was beyond the scope of this thesis 
to supplement with this. 
 
Another limitation with my thesis is that the cases chosen for the empirical section have 
many variables that are unaccounted for, as for instance maturity of technologies, 
motivations for establishment in China, support from back office, industry they operate 
in and so on. The cases nevertheless showed similarities in the empirical findings, but 
these variables should anyway be taken in for consideration as potentially influencing 
the conclusions drawn from this thesis. 
 
9.2 Future research 
 
I mentioned in the introduction that a few attempt have been made on incorporating 
cross-cultural aspects to related topics. I nevertheless believe that the future research to 
be stressed the most is to continue incorporating the cultural aspect into other fields. 
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More research is needed before any conclusions as to exactly how and to which extent 
the cultural affect technology transfer. This counts for research where organizational 
culture is the focus as well. 
 
Also, I believe that more case studies are needed, especially when looking into 
technology transfer processes, as this is the only method that can capture the cultural 
effects on transfer processes in a satisfying way. 
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Appendix A: 
 
Interview Guide, Person X, Position X, Firm X 
 
Facts About the Firm: 
 
Write facts about Firm X, and especially facts about the Firm X in NIP. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Can you tell me a little about yourself and your role in firm X? How long have you 
been working in Ningbo? 
2. How many employees do you have at your Ningbo Plant? What is the nationality 
rate (Norwegians and expatriates vs. Chinese)? 
3. What were your firm’s motivations and driving forces behind opening up 
production in Ningbo?  
a. How did the decision process evolve? 
b. Why in Ningbo? 
c. What is your vision and goal, with the plant? 
4. How did you proceed in building up competence in Nordic Industrial Park (NIP)? 
a. Transfer of technology and knowledge. How did you ensure not to loose 
competence during the transfer process? 
b. Do you have, or will you have, an R&D department in NIP?  
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c. Are you adapting any technology, routines or regulations to better suit the 
local environment?  
d. Do you use NIP’s recruitment service, or do you recruit employees on your 
own (if mixed, how much)? 
e. How do you proceed in the recruitment process?  
f. What kind and how much training do you provide to your employees? Who 
conducts the training? Do you provide any cultural training? 
5. Do you have any policies about what nationalities (expatriates/Chinese) and how 
many of each nationality your employees should have? What about language 
skills?  
6. What have been the biggest challenges of bringing your Ningbo Plant up to the 
standards of other production units your firm has?  
a. Do you have the same requirement as to standards and type of production 
(standard vs. custom made)? 
b. How is the production efficiency compared to your other manufacturing sites? 
c. What about innovation at the Ningbo Plant? 
d. Which of the NIP services do you use?  
e. How do you find the cross-cultural cooperation in your firm to affect 
performance? 
7. Can you describe conflict situations you have had in the workplace? 
a. Is there any common denominator in the conflicts? 
b. Have you been able to solve the conflicts? 
c. How do you proceed in solving the conflicts? 
8. How has your Ningbo plant lived up to your expectations? 
a. Costs? 
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b. Quality of production, services and locations? 
c. Efficiency? 
d. What do your customers think about your NIP plant? 
e. Do you have plans of expanding? 
9. Is there anything you want to tell me that I have not already asked? 
10. Are there any other people you believe I should interview on this matter? 
 
 
